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ABSTRACT
TIME’S DEEP RHYTHMS:
MODELS, MECHANISMS, AND NARRATIVES IN HISTORICAL EXPLANATION
Daniel G. Swaim
Michael Weisberg
My dissertation is focused on the question of how it is that explanation works in the
“historical sciences” (i.e. scientific disciplines dealing with questions of the deep past). I
survey the extant literature in order to develop a loose taxonomy of approaches as
developed up to this point. While there are some deep differences in these approaches, at
least one common theme emerges: the overwhelming majority of philosophical (and
scientific) work on historical narrative explanation understands such explanations to be
focused on highly particularized explanatory targets. That is, narrative explanations are
understood to involve the reconstruction of highly particular causal histories that are
supposed to explain the generation of a highly particular explananda of interest. The
majority of the literature, then, has (wittingly or unwittingly) upheld the distinction
between the so-called nomothetic sciences (e.g. physics) and the idiographic sciences
(e.g. paleontology). The nomothetic sciences, it is supposed, offer explanations in terms
of laws and regularities, whereas the idiographic sciences explain by “depicting”
narrative structures. Further, the idiographic sciences, insofar as they explain, supposedly
do so in a way that is impoverished relative to the nomothetic sciences. I think this
distinction rests on several mistakes, which I attempt to remedy in my dissertation.
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Chapter 1: An Overview of Historical Explanation
1. Introduction
Philosophers (and philosophers of science especially) have longstanding concern with the
notion of explanation (see Salmon 1989). Science, we are told, is in the business of
explaining things. What, precisely, this amounts to has been a source of much
controversy. Some have argued that explanatory knowledge involves the deduction of
events to be explained from prior events in combination with universal laws (Hempel and
Oppenheim 1948); others have claimed that explanation involves reducing the unfamiliar
to the familiar (Hanson 1958; Scriven 1959); or that explanation involves demonstrating
that some event which occurred must have occurred (see Salmon 1984, pp. 16-17); or that
to explain means to unify seemingly disparate phenomena (Friedman 1974; Kitcher
1989). Perhaps the most popular general view of scientific explanation now is what we
may call the causal view, which just says that in one way or another, the thing to be
explained is explained by saying something about what caused it (Salmon 1984; Strevens
2008; Woodward 2002).
The authors cited above all offer general models of scientific explanation. While
debates over these models are complicated and interesting, it is not the central goal of this
work to resolve disputes between the defenders of various rival models of scientific
explanation. My aim is to solve a different (though related) problem: how to properly
conceive of explanation in the historical sciences. It has been widely argued that
scientific reasoning about the past faces some unique problems (Turner 2007; Currie
2018; Mayr 1983; Gould 1989). These problems include the remoteness of historical
events, their uniqueness, their underdetermination, and the inaccessibility of relevant
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empirical evidence. A possible consequence of these problems is that the historical
sciences require different explanatory strategies than their non-historical counterparts.
The historical sciences may require a form of narrative explanation that’s distinct from
the explanatory modes mentioned above (see Mayr 1983; Richards 1992).
I will attempt to dispel this notion. Whatever narratives are, in the historical
sciences, they are not (in my view) a separate or distinct form of scientific explanation
that stands apart from the rest. I will argue, rather, that what has been called “narrative
explanation” is a form of structural-mechanical explanation. Given that this is so,
narrative explanation is of a whole with the rest of scientific explanation; the concept is,
then, deflated, reduced, or something of that nature, but this is no cause for alarm. There
are two main things that will be argued for: the first is that what we call “narrative
explanation” requires a new treatment of the notion of “possibility,” and the second is the
thing just mentioned: narrative explanations are structural-mechanical models.
There is much to unpack in the claims just advanced. That said, I won’t be
unpacking them in this chapter (or not mainly, anyway). In this chapter I’ll review the
philosophical work on narrative and historical explanation that’s been done up to now.1
The first task will be to lay out a taxonomy of views on narrative explanation. This will
prove to be somewhat involved, as there’s no clear sorting method to be deployed, in part
because the very notion of “narrative” frequently proves slippery. It often seems that
much is left open to interpretation. Nevertheless, I will do my best to impose a bit of
conceptual order over the landscape of narrative explanation. As things progress, I’ll
1

It’s worth noting that not every author covered here refers to their account of explanation as an account of
“narrative” explanation. I take historical and narrative explanation to be effectively equivalent, and so take
the terms to be functionally synonymous.
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work to fit existing views into the conceptual landscape that I’ve set out, while also
signaling areas of agreement and disagreement. This chapter, then, is a review, but one of
a decidedly opinionated nature. My aim is to be fair and evenhanded, but I don’t pretend
to be giving a “view from nowhere.” To close, I’ll gesture at some of the broad features
of the positive account to come.

2. Preliminaries on narrative
First things first. What is a narrative, anyway? And how can a narrative explain? It’s fair
to say that there’s no universally accepted answer to either of these questions (see Klauk
2016, for instance).2 Perhaps the best approach for this general discussion is to start with
a philosophically neutral characterization of “narrative” and “narrative explanation.”
In the spirit of neutrality, then, we’ll adopt the following (strictly provisional)
definition of narrative: a narrative is a temporally extended sequence of events, bound
together by some kind of relation. Not very informative, granted, but it does seem to
capture what differing views hold in common: narratives involve processes that happen in
and over time (sometimes large amounts of time), but not just any process that happened
in and over time. The processes of interest are ones that are bound together in some
special sense. Just what sense that is turns out to be a matter of dispute, as we’ll come to
see shortly.
The move from narrative to narrative explanation, then, is pretty straightforward
(at least in the generic terms of our present discussion). A narrative explanation situates
2

Klauk argues that there is no autonomous category of explanation called “narrative.” Whatever is
explanatory about narrative is explanatory for some other reason, not having to do with the fact of
narrativity.
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some fact or event to be explained in terms of some narrative sequence to which it is
appropriately tied (see Currie 2019). The explanation for the end-cretaceous extinction is
a narrative explanation that situates the event to be explained (extinction) in terms of a
temporal process that appropriately accounts for its occurrence (meteorite impact, etc.).
This is just an example. For now, I make no commitments to any specific conception of
which “situating” relations are (or aren’t) explanatorily appropriate.

3. Taxonomic elements
As mentioned above, it’s a bit difficult to impose a strict taxonomy over the landscape of
narrative explanation.3 The borders between opposing views often seem fuzzy, and the
concepts deployed in a given account can often seem imprecise to a (perhaps)
problematic degree (see Mink 1970 for discussion). Even so, I think it’s possible to make
some headway on the issue, if we can strike the right balance between taxonomic rigidity
and conceptual flexibility. To that end, I propose the taxonomic categories here to be read
as continuum concepts, along which the views of different authors may be placed relative
to others.
I will sort extant approaches to narrative explanation along four axes of
conceptual variation: (1) a constructivist/realist axis; (2) an interpretivist/causalist axis;
(3) a possibilist/actualist axis; (4) a nominalist/structuralist axis. These axes may not be
independent of one another. A certain approach to causes in narrative explanation, for
instance, may make one more likely to adopt an actualist stance—Hempel’s implicit

3

Tucker’s (2009) essay volume is a helpful resource for sampling some of the recent work from a number
of different approaches.
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determinism, say, seems to have little use for “historical possibilities” (see Hempel 1942).
But before digging into the details of various theories, we should take some time to
unpack the meaning of these four axes of variation.

3.1 The constructivist/realist axis
The constructivist/realist axis is meant to record the degree to which a theory of narrative
explanation takes it that narratives truthfully describe past events as they actually were.
As I understand it, the narrative realist is committed to the idea that narratives are truth
apt: they can, at least potentially, provide true descriptions of historical sequences. Given
some evidence set and some historical fact to be explained, the realist claims that it is
possible to craft at least approximately true narratives out of the available evidence, and
the closer the approximation to the truth, the better the explanation.
The constructivist takes a different view. To the constructivist, a narrative is
something like a “cognitive tool” (see Collingwood 1946; Mink 1978). The historical
scientist does the craftwork of narrative construction, but not in the realist’s sense just
mentioned. It’s hard to characterize the constructivist attitude in precise terms, as it is
often described only in terms of what it does not do (e.g. aim at truth). Louis Mink (1978)
describes the idea helpfully in terms of storytelling: by constructing historical narratives,
human agents project a kind of intelligible structure onto events, because of the
significance those events have for us as humans. There’s no pretense, however, to the
notion that the structures we project are mapping onto the objective structure of the
world. Narratives primarily reflect human interest in the world, not the world’s objective
structure.
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3.2 The interpretivist/causalist axis
The interpretivist/causalist axis records the degree to which a theorist takes narrative
explanation to be a species of causal explanation. Many theories of narrative explanation
are straightforwardly causalist. This is especially clear in historical sciences like
evolutionary biology and geology. It is commonly held that many evolutionary
explanations involve the narrative reconstruction of salient paleobiological events (see
Mayr 1983; Goudge 1961). The object of historical explanation, then, is explained by
situating it in terms of the causal history that produced or accounts for it.4
The interpretivist is less committed to the claim that the proper “situating”
relation is a causal one. Some argue that narrative explanation requires the inhabitation of
historical “mindsets” (especially in the case of human history) (Collingwood 1946), or
perhaps bringing the event to be explained under the right “concept.” (see Dray 1959).
Broadly, interpretivist positions may be seen as advocating various types of “reasons
explanations,” wherein the relevant species of reasons are not necessarily seen as causal.
William Dray (ibid.) says that historical explanations are (at least sometimes) “what
explanations”—to explain the French Revolution, for instance, is in part to see that it falls
under the concept “revolutionary movement.”

3.3 The possibilist/actualist axis
This is probably the most straightforward of the categories I’m offering. The possibilist is
committed to the claim that narrative explanations should, in a non-trivial sense, appeal
4

The “situating” locution is borrowed from Currie (2019). Currie argues that narratives explain in part by
showing “how things hang together.” This notion has a bit of a coherentist flavor that I’m not committed to,
although the notion of “situating” is itself rather nice.
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to alternative historical possibilities. For any outcome that may have obtained in a
particular historical narrative, there exists an alternate historical narrative leading to some
other outcome, and narrative explanations should somehow do the work of situating
actual outcomes within the context of possible, but unrealized ones (Beatty 2016; 2017).
The possibilist claims that narratives involve crucial ‘turning points’ (or contingencies)5
wherein things break one way in the narrative unfolding, though it may well have gone
some other way (Beatty 2016; Gallie 1964; Glennan 2010).
The actualist, naturally, takes a different view. The actualist claims that narrative
explanations need make no essential reference to alternative or unrealized possibilities.
This may be for epistemic or ontological reasons. Some actualists claim that the
possibilist is staking a claim on a deep metaphysical issue, and needlessly so (Ereshefsky
and Turner 2020). Others claim that the notion of possibility is merely epistemic, and so
no essential reference is being made to alternative possibilities as “real” (see Ghiselin
1969). In any case, the primary claim of actualists is that narrative explanations aim to
make sense only of what happened, not what might have happened. And insofar as the
actualist does make use of possibilities, it’s in a comparatively thin way. “Alternative
possibilities”denote histories that we can’t seem to eliminate on the basis of current
evidence, not compossible histories.

5

Some authors (e.g. Gallie 1964) seem to think of turning points and contingencies as different terms for
the same thing. In Beatty’s (2016) case it seems like turning points are the contingencies that “matter”;
they’re the ones where something crucial happens.
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3.4 The nominalist/structuralist axis
Whereas

the possibilist/actualist

distinction seems

pretty straightforward, the

nominalist/structuralist distinction is tricky to characterize. The basic notion, as I
understand it, is that the nominalist is committed to something like the notion of
historical individualism as the basis for narrative explanations, whereas the structuralist
will make free appeal to higher levels of organization for explanatory purposes.
There’s a great deal of variety in positions on both ends of this scale. A general
characterization of nominalism might be put as follows: what matters for historical
explanations are particular historical entities and their very particular historical
trajectories. We can think of, for instance, the notion of “thick description” as picking out
a kind of narrative nominalism. If you want to give a narrative explanation of the
emergence of, say, particular social practices, you have to do deep, descriptive
ethnography (see Little 1991, ch. 4). That is, you have to know what it’s like to be a
human person in the highly particularized historical and cultural context from which the
practice emerged. Abstract explanations abstract away from key explanatory facts.
The structuralist, however, makes free use of the tools of idealization and
abstraction. For the structuralist, many (perhaps all) narrative explanations are actually
population-level explanations (Sterelny 2016; Turchin 2006). To explain a successful
conquest somewhere in the human past it suffices to demonstrate how it results from
certain aggregate-level facts: relative wealth of the warring societies, their social
structure, the distribution of natural resources, warfighting technology, etc. To pick out
any particular historical entity (e.g. a person) as central to the narrative process would be
a mistake, as the proper narrative subjects in history are actually distributed systems.
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3.4 Concluding remarks on narrative taxonomy
I’ve laid out a four-part taxonomy of theories of narrative explanation. These four
categories are meant to be thought of as denoting poles between which various theories
may be placed, based on the commitments of the theory. The four categories are: (1) a
constructivist/realist axis; (2) an interpretivist/causalist axis; (3) a possibilist/actualist
axis; and (4) a nominalist/structuralist axis. The discussion up to now, however, has been
quite cursory. I’ll now turn to a more detailed discussion of each of these categories,
exploring some theories of narrative that I take to be representative of certain positions on
these axes of variation. Critical remarks will be included throughout.

4. The question of historical realism
In the previous section we established that there exists some disagreement over the
question of historical realism. As regards narrative explanation, the idea underlying
historical realism is that narratives are truth apt—that there exists some way of linking
past events or processes together, under some appropriate relation, such that narratives so
constructed can be said to be at least approximately true. The task of providing an
explanation in narrative form, then, is to approximate how things actually were.
Anti-realists will, for various reasons, claim that this isn’t possible, or that it isn’t the real
epistemic aim of narrativization.

4.1 Truth, interpretation, and narrative aggregativity
Our intuitive idea is that history, whatever else it may be, is fixed in the past. What has
happened has, well, happened, and so the task of the historical scientist is just to uncover
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the facts about what happened.6 Realism of the simplest sort, then, would amount to the
claim that history is just a repository of what has come to pass, and the historical
scientist, using whatever evidence and methodological tools may be available to her, is in
the business of reconstructing the past to a best approximation to the truth. But here
already the realist is going to come in for some criticism.
The debate over scientific realism has raged for some time now (see Leplin 1984
for a number of classic papers). Truth, it turns out, is one of the main points of contention
among realism’s detractors. The same is true on the question of historical realism. There
are a few ways in which historical anti-realists criticize the notion of truth in historical
science. I’ll examine three: Derek Turner’s (2007) justificationist critique, Louis Mink’s
(1978) cognitivist critique, and Paul Roth’s (2012, 2017) interpretivist critique. Note: the
names assigned to these forms of criticism are my own. Also note that I said these axes of
variation are meant to be continuum concepts. With that in mind, I mean to cast Turner’s
anti-realism as a rather centrist form, Mink’s as somewhat more radical, and Roth’s as
more radical still.
Turner (2007, pp. 138-149) takes some inspiration from Michael Dummett
(1979). Dummett offers a justificationist conception of truth. This has the effect of
linking the notion of truth to what one may be warranted in asserting. Generically, some
sentence “P” is true if and only if the presently available evidence is sufficient to justify
asserting P (Turner 2007, p. 140). Not to be divorced entirely from the world, we can also

6

Mink (1978) argues that this is just a hangover from the older idea of a ‘Universal History’ as the proper
regulative ideal. It’s unclear to me what the aspiration to Universal History has to do with a commitment to
the objective reality of the past.
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introduce a “T-schema” that stipulates that “P” is true if and only if P (ibid.). Putting
these elements together, Turner offers the following argument:
P1. “P” is true if and only if P.
P2. “P” is true if and only if the presently available evidence is sufficient to justify
asserting that P.
C. P if and only if the presently available evidence is sufficient to justify asserting
that P.
The interesting thing to note is that what is “true” on this view is subject to change over
time, as surely we’ll agree that those claims which we’re justified in asserting as a
function of evidence have changed over time (pretty dramatically).
Turner does not exactly endorse the Dummettian view he sketches in his (2007)
work, but it does, I think, turn out to inform the view he ultimately adopts, which he
terms the “Natural Historical Attitude” (to mirror Fine 1984). He advises a kind of
agnosticism, but it’s an agnosticism that’s driven by the kind of justificationist concerns
that he takes Dummett to have raised about the notion of truth. Our realist commitments
should be functions of the available evidence, according to Turner (2007, p. 156). We
said earlier that the basic realist commitment is to the idea that the past is something like
a repository of all the past facts. Historical reconstructions (or narratives) are principled
orderings of those facts, some of which are better approximations to the truth than others.
But on Turner’s view it’s not at all clear that we could ever be justified in claiming that
some hypothesis H deserves our realist commitments whereas some empirically
equivalent (but incompatible) rival H* does not. There will always be some rival that our
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evidence fails to discharge, and so we should refrain from staking claims as to the truth
(in the realist’s sense) of our efforts at reconstruction.
I think Turner’s criticisms of certain strains of realism are apt (he targets Devitt
1991 in particular). Underdetermination does seem to loom large in the historical
sciences, and is a widely-recognized problem for any abductive argument for realism
(Laudan 1984; Stanford 2006). In what’s to come, I’ll try to ameliorate these concerns by
focusing on the role of mechanisms in historical explanation, which is something Turner
doesn’t really cover. The main force driving the plausibility of Turner’s criticisms is the
existence of undischarged rivals (i.e. underdetermination of any historical hypothesis). I
certainly won’t claim that this problem doesn’t exist, but I think the account I develop
over the next few chapters blunts some of the force of these criticisms.
Mink’s (1978) and Roth’s (2012, 2017) critiques of historical realism are more
radical. Mink’s primary attack on historical realism is cognitive. To narrativize is for the
historical scientist to project onto the world something which it does not have: a narrative
structure. The historical scientist projects a narrative structure onto the world in order to
render it intelligible, but this falls far short of truth. There is no “real” narrative to be told,
as the world has no narrative structure. There is “what happened” in the past, but to
construct a narrative is to “configure” those facts in a way that’s peculiar to the historical
scientist attempting to understand them (Mink 1978; Ereshefsky and Turner 2020; Beatty
2016). Narrative is a cognitive tool that historical scientists use to impose an intelligible
structure on the world.
Roth (2012, 2017) does this one better, as for him, the notion of an historical
event is itself constructed by the historical scientist. Historical events, on his view, are not
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part of the proper ontology of the past—they are part of the constructive epistemology of
the historical scientist. Take an event like the Black Plague. When did it start? Roth
(2016, 2017) argues that there’s no answer to this question, except as a part of an
interpretive exercise on the part of the historical scientist. Fourteenth century Europeans
wouldn’t have conceived of it as “an event” called “The Black Plague,” as for them all of
the processes involved are unfolding in such a way as to make one event bleed
imperceptibly into another. Lots of people are getting sick, sure, but there’s no sense in
which this counts as an “event of history” for them. According to Roth, it is the historian
that makes these processes historical events by bringing them under the constructed
category of “The Black Plague.”
Mink and Roth both attack the notion of narrative aggregativity, too.7
Aggregativity is the idea that parallel historical narratives should jointly form a full
picture of history. Different historical scientists may work to reconstruct different
narrative threads of the same historical epoch, and if narratives aggregate, that means
their narratives should be (ideally, anyway) consistent with one another, and so by
compiling them we get a fuller (and perhaps more accurate) picture of the epoch in
question (see Danto 1962). Mink and Roth deny that narratives aggregate. Given their
conceptions of the historical scientist’s role in constructing narratives, they find that
there’s an ineliminable residue of the historian’s hand in every narrative, which makes
strict consistency, and therefore aggregativity, impossible.

7

Gallie (1964) also seems to suggest that narratives will fail to aggregate, but he doesn’t seem to think this
has any consequences for our realist commitments about history. It strikes me as true that no harm is done
to realism even if Roth and Mink are correct here. If we’re thinking in terms of models, it’s not hard to
imagine narratives that are strictly inconsistent with one another, and yet still approximately true.
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I don’t have much sympathy for these stronger versions of historical anti-realism.
In both Mink’s and Roth’s case it seems we can admit there’s some grain of truth to their
criticisms, but it’s not clear that it does any real harm to the basic commitments of
historical realism. Take Mink’s claim that narratives are cognitive instruments, projecting
some structure onto the world that isn’t really there. The model-driven view that I’ll
ultimately advocate doesn’t exactly deny this, but it doesn’t follow that narrative
explanations aren’t truth tropic. Models are false. They employ a broad range of
idealizations and abstractions with respect to their real-world targets (see Weisberg 2007).
Even so, models can enable us to say true things about the world. If narratives are models
of mechanistic processes (as I’ll argue later), then their status as “cognitive tools” is
beside the point on the question of realism.
Similarly, Roth (2017) may be right to point out that the status of “eventhood” is
in some sense constructed—but this misses the real point of historical realism, as I
conceive of it. “Events,” to one way of thinking, might just be bookkeeping devices. That
is, the realist is not committed to there being an event called “The Black Plague,” which
is picked out by the correct narrative reconstruction. Rather, the realist is committed to
there being a set of historical processes, and referring to a part of them as “The Black
Plague” is a benefit to our conceptual and cognitive economy. The name of the event
refers to the thing that carried our true realist commitments: the causal-historical process
itself. The event is an epistemic convenience.
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4.2 Grades of realism
Now I’ll turn my attention to authors with more realist commitments. This will be
somewhat more brief than the discussion of anti-realist attitudes, as realism has in some
measure already been covered in my critical remarks.
I take W.B. Gallie (1964) to be a nice representative of a minimally realist
attitude. On his account, the grasping of an historical explanation means to “have
followed a narrative” (ibid.). The act of constructing a followable narrative requires a
kind of expertise, as narratives essentially involve (on his view) contingencies (see also
Beatty 2016). Certain events stand out as unexpected or unintelligible in relation to
what’s happened before them, but by constructing and following a narrative,
contingencies are rendered intelligible. Perhaps, then, we should say that on Gallie’s
view, to grasp a narrative explanation means to follow a narrative through to its
conclusion (see Mink 1971). On some level this just amounts to reconstructing a
sequence of events from the available evidence; but sometimes the evidence turns out to
be gappy, and so the historical scientist must interpolate (Gallie 1964, p.122).8 Even so,
the historical scientist is constrained by the evidence, which includes knowledge of the
causal processes underlying the narrative sequence (Gallie 1955). So, the historical
scientist’s interpretive faculties (in the sense of Mink 1978; Roth 2017) may enter the
fray where gaps in the evidence rear their head, but minding the constraints of plausibility
means that we still have some reason to think narratives may approximate the truth, to
some degree.

8

This insight just tracks the well-worn “Book of Nature” metaphor. Historical scientists are trying to
reconstruct a text from traces; or at least this often seems so (Turner 2011).
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I think all of this is basically correct. But I think Gallie (and others)9 are too tied
to the notion of “trace-based reasoning” in history and historical science (see Currie
2018). I think stronger forms of realism can be made plausible, if we think carefully
about explanation, evidence, and inference, and what demands each of these places on
our realist commitments.
Gallie’s idea of narrative explanation, then, is trace-based and vertical. That is, his
notion is that narrative reconstruction is executed by thinking about the relationship
between the present and the past, as directed by traces of evidence. Currie (2018) argues
that we can do better than this—we can reconstruct the links between past states of the
world and present ones, and we can also reconstruct relations between past states of the
world and other past states of the world. What I have to say in the account to be
developed ties in with these debates in interesting ways. Specifically, the use of models
focuses our attention on truth in interesting and, perhaps, unanticipated ways. It also
draws our attention away from historical particulars and toward an account involving
event types, which provides for a novel kind of historical realism.

5. Causation and interpretation
The second of four axes of variation to be explored is the interpretivist/causalist axis. As
in the previous section, we’ll explore both some moderate and some extreme views to
hopefully get a clearer picture of how different views can vary on this axis. As before, my
sympathies will become clear as the section progresses.

9

Cleland (2011) and Turner (2007) are nice examples.
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5.1 Narratives, cultures, and reasons
Here I’ll explore two interpretivist versions of narrative explanation: William Dray’s
(1959) reasons view, and Clifford Geertz’s (1971) culturalist view.10 As before, I take
these views as representatives of different grades of interpretivist commitment, Dray’s
being somewhat more moderate, Geertz’s being a bit more radical.
According to Dray (1959), historical explanation is primarily to do with bringing
historical events under an appropriate concept (see Whewell 1837 on “colligation”).11 To
give an explanation of the social processes in late eighteenth century France, say, is to
bring those processes under their appropriate concept: popular revolution (ibid. p. 403).
The facts about what happened, then, constitute the reasons supporting a particular
conception of the relevant events. What is central to the task of explaining the events in
question is thereby not (or not primarily) a matter of telling a causal story out of which
the events arose. That is, telling the causal history of events leading up to the French
Revolution would not constitute an explanation of the French Revolution, because a
causal history doesn’t tell you what those events are. To give explanations of historical
events, according to Dray, is to provide some reasons that tell you what the events in
question actually are, and this is a different kind of explanation than a merely causal one
(see also Gallie 1964, pp. 107-109 for commentary).
The reasons view might not cut too deep against the causalist. There are basically
two positions one might hold on the reasons view. It might be that reasons (in Dray’s

10

This view is closely tied to the work of scholars in cultural anthropology more broadly. See Little (1991,
ch. 3) for a nice overview.
11
Whewell argues that colligation is the key to all induction. In his famous exchange with Mill, he argues
that Kepler’s crucial insight was to unify planetary motion under the concept of the ellipse—a concept
which is not itself present in the data (see Patton 2014; Achinstein 1992).
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sense) are doing all (or most) of the explanatory work, and so causal histories are
irrelevant to the task of narrative explanation. This would be too much. An alternative
view is just that causal histories are incomplete. Causal histories might just need some
supplementation in order to make them explanatorily adequate, and this may be what the
reasons view provides. This seems more palatable, but its palatability will depend on
what sort of gloss we put on the notion of “reasons” (or “bringing under a concept,” etc.).
For Gallie (1964), what Dray’s view brings out is the need for certain pragmatic elements
to be present in our explanatory endeavors. We need some interpretive tools to make
things intelligible to us, as the causal web of history often won’t speak for itself. This
deflationary conception of reasons in terms of pragmatics seems fine, but if we mean that
“explaining what” means to carve out the right “natural historical kind” or some such
thing, then I’ll have to withhold my assent. Seeing the events of 1789 as a revolution can
do pragmatic work, but it’s much less clear that “revolution” is itself a natural kind that
does real explanatory heavy lifting.
Further out on the interpretivist end of the interpretivist/causalist axis is what I
term the culturalist view of Geertz (1971). Geertz argues that what is essential to
narrative explanation (and social-historical explanation more broadly) is “thick
description” (ibid.; see also Morgan 2017). What this means (as mentioned briefly in
section 3) is that to give a narrative explanation of historical events is to see those events
(as much as possible) from the phenomenological perspective of an agent within a
particular cultural and historical context. In so doing we can lace the events of interest
with cultural interpretations that make them intelligible from within the matrix of the
cultural and historical fabric in which they’re embedded. Geertz (1971) offers an in-depth
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exploration of cockfighting in Bali to explore his culturalist themes. What is important,
he contends, is that the cockfight isn’t just a cockfight, but a representative of themes in
the cultural psyche of Balinese men: “In the cockfight, man and beast, good and evil, ego
and id, the creative power of aroused masculinity and the destructive power of loosened
animality fuse in a bloody drama of hatred, cruelty, violence, and death” (pp. 420-421).
The material artifacts of culture (chickens, fights, then men involved, the monetary
stakes, etc.) may be part of a causal and material fabric in which events unfold, but they
can only be narrativized and explained by providing an interpretation of their significance
against a particular cultural backdrop. Here, Geertz argues, we see the darker elements of
the collective psychology of the Balinese culture finding release in a certain controlled
setting—the artifacts of cockfighting are something like a stage for their expression.
The problem with the culturalist view is that it ties the power of explanation too
closely to description (as is seemingly implied by the very notion of “thick description”).
In many cases (perhaps most cases) the power of an explanation is not increased by
providing more descriptive detail, but instead diminished (here I’ll throw in with
unificationists such as Kitcher (1989)). This isn’t to say that local facts are to be ignored.
In geological, biological, anthropological, and historical explanation, the local facts of the
material domain are in fact the crucial materials out of which explanatory models must be
crafted, and in this sense, we must pay close attention to methodological and interpretive
practices. But this can only be the start of an explanation. Descriptions don’t answer
“why questions,” or at least not substantively. To answer why questions we need to go to
the level of causes. And if we want the causal information in our narrative to be properly
explanatory, it should say more than that “this event caused the event that followed, and
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so on.” Narratives should fit into a broader mechanistic model, if they’re to be thought of
as explanatory.

5.2 Narratives and causes
My taste for causal treatments of narrative explanation has already been signaled in the
critical remarks on interpretivism in the above. Now I’ll briefly turn my attention more
explicitly to the causalist side of the interpretivist/causalist axis. For illustration, we’ll
look to Gallie’s (1964) hybrid view, and a causal sequence view that’s captured by people
like Ernst Mayr (1983) and Adrian Currie (2014).
Gallie’s hybrid view of narrative has already been alluded to where we discussed
William Dray’s (1959, 1971) reasons conception of historical explanation. It merits
further discussion here. Gallie’s view is interesting because it highlights certain trade-offs
between ontic and epistemic considerations in narrative explanation.12 Gallie is certainly
willing to say that causes are part of what drive narratives forward—this fact seems
undeniable. To that extent, it seems clear enough that causes should feature prominently
in historical narratives, if they’re to be properly explanatory. But this can’t be the whole
story, as narrative is, at least in part, an epistemic tool. The narrative description of a
causal history isn’t the same thing as the causal history itself, so a proper conception of
narrative explanation must make room for certain pragmatic features. The evidence can
only carry us so far. To quote Gallie, “historical explanations cannot be directly supported
by ‘hard’ historical evidence, since the question about any historical explanation is not a
12

See Salmon (1984) for detailed discussion of the distinction. My own approach is primarily ontic, and to
the extent that my account is epistemic, it will be due to context sensitive features of explanation that
respond to certain ontic features. I’ll discuss this in more detail in what’s to come.
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question of fact, but the best way of arranging the facts” (p. 124). Gallie argues that the
notion of “arrangement” in part involves (similarly to Dray (1959)) the historical scientist
directing our historical attention to what she takes to be the important aspects in coming
to a correct interpretation of the material. That pragmatics creep in here seems clear
enough, as whether and how a narrative explains is in part a function of what the
historian or historical scientist understands as crucial.
Gallie’s ideas seem to echo much of what’s been said in more recent literature on
scientific explanation, especially in the literature on pluralism (e.g. Potochnik 2017).
Many have drawn attention to the fact that scientists seem to deploy a broad array of
explanatory strategies, and so general models of explanation stand in need of revision in
order to make room for a pluralistic treatment where many relations (e.g. causal,
mathematical, logical, pragmatic) may be seen as explanatory, depending on the context
of scientific investigation. I have some sympathies in this direction, but to my way of
thinking, the context sensitive features should be tracking facts about the world, not (or
not only, anyway) facts about historians, scientists, and their particular explanatory aims.
Gallie seems pretty open concerning what can be considered an explanatory legitimate
pragmatic consideration: whatever the historical scientist takes as salient with respect to
structural arrangements of the facts is fair game. The world should push back much
harder than Gallie seems to suggest.
Mayr (1983) and Currie (2014) offer a more straightforward conception of causal
narratives: what explains some historical phenomenon is just the causal history that
produced it. Mayr argues that narrative explanation of this causal sort features
prominently in evolutionary biology. To explain the emergence of some biological trait is
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to say something about the causes, working in and over time, that produced it (p. 325).
Insofar as we are in the business of explaining the emergence of the trait, it must be
because we can point to adaptive regimes that would have produced it, etc.
Currie’s view is also straightforwardly causal, but he adds some complications to
Mayr’s comparatively vanilla take. For Currie there are two kinds of causal narratives:
simple ones and complex ones, and he argues simple narratives and complex narratives
don’t explain in exactly the same way. Simple narratives can explain in terms of
mechanisms (as Currie understands the term), whereas complex narratives cannot. This is
because simple narratives rely on robust regularities for their explanatory power, whereas
complex narratives involve diffuse, distributed systems of causal contributions.13 We’ll
cover this in more depth in the coming chapters, but for now, we can think of the
distinction in the following way: simple narratives involve well-integrated targets that are
explained by a single causal process, whereas complex narratives involve multi-faceted
targets that are explained by many intersecting causal processes (Currie 2014). In any
case, what explains the historical phenomena of interest is their causal history, simple or
otherwise.
I don’t really disagree with the basic approach of Mayr, Currie, and other
narrative causalists.14 I do, however, want to flag a difference in my approach. As stated
above, I will argue that narratives are properly thought of as models (more specifically
structural-mechanical models) (see Glennan 2017, pp. 83-85). Thinking of narratives as

13

Currie’s favored example is the evolution of gigantism in Sauropods. Gigantism requires certain skeletal
features, feeding patterns, metabolic mechanisms, and reproductive behaviors. There’s no one causal
mechanism accounting for all of these features, and so Currie argues the explanation of gigantism is not
mechanistic. See his (2014) for detailed discussion. For a different take, see Glennan (2010).
14
Not in spirit, that is, but certainly on some particulars.
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models provides some crucial insight into where their explanatory power comes
from—namely, a similarity relation (though I will offer some critiques of similarity, too).
From a similarity perspective, I think causal structure is the most important dimension of
the world that narratives should capture, at least insofar as we’re taking them to be
explanatory. By thinking in terms of models, however, we get some insight into the
explanatory uses of idealization, abstraction, and causal generalization in narrative
contexts. In this way, the causal history that produces the explanatory fact of interest is
only part of the story.

6. The possible and the actual
We now turn to a more in-depth exploration of the possibilist/actualist axis. Again we’ll
see more and less extremes of both sorts of views. On this topic my view will emerge as a
more ecumenical take than has been the case in the previous two sections, and I’ll say a
bit about why.

6.1 When what was need not have been
The possibilist claims that narrative explanation functions in part by situating what
happened in terms of what did not, but might have happened. I take it that this view
comes in basically three grades: possibility as sensitivity to initial conditions (Gould
1989; Newton 1998), possibility as path dependence (Wimsatt 2007), and possibility as
genuine openness (Beatty 2017; Desjardins 2011).
Possibility in the first sense is relatively straightforward. Stephen J. Gould (1989)
introduces a biological thought experiment to pump our intuitions. He invites us to
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imagine the possibility of rewinding the tape of evolution, to then play it forward again,
keeping in mind the question, “Will the history of life on Earth look the same on the next
play?” Gould is positive that it would not (ibid.). The reason is that the shape of
evolutionary history (i.e. the shape of life’s “tree”)15 is highly sensitive to minute changes
in conditions, considered over the historical long-run. A small change in the distribution
of species in the latter part of the Cambrian period, for instance, might mean that Pikaia
(thought to be the earliest relative of the chordates) would have failed to escape the
clutches of the extinction event that wiped out the majority of the Cambrian fauna, which
might also imply that humans would never have evolved (ibid. pp. 45-52). It may be, on
this view, that the course of history is set once some set of conditions are in place and the
tape gets rolling—but getting those same conditions on each play might be a matter of
(low) probability (see Conway Morris 2004, pp. 47-49).
The next kind of possibilism is possibilism as path dependence. William Wimsatt
(2007) has done the most, I think, to bring out the explanatory import of path dependence
with respect to historical processes. Wimsatt (ibid. pp. 133-134) argues, through the
principle of generative entrenchment, that path dependence runs deep through the
historical sciences (evolution, in particular). A generatively entrenched feature is one that
has many other (downstream) features depending on it. Homeobox genes for bilateral
symmetry, for instance, are generatively entrenched in humans, as many parts of normal
human development depend on their normal expression in ontogeny. The notion of
possibility here, then, is a kind of conditional possibility: what future states of a system

15

Gould famously argues against the traditional picture of the expanding “tree.” So read the use of this
terminology loosely.
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are possible depends on some past states, and their level of entrenchment. John Beatty
(2016) distinguishes between notions of contingency upon and contingency per se. Here
we have a clear conception of contingency upon. What is possible in the downstream
development of the system is contingent upon earlier states, and the level of
entrenchment in the relations that hold between them.
Beatty (2016, 2017) argues for the strongest sense of possibility: possibility as
genuine openness.16 In fact, Beatty argues that a world of genuine possibilities is the only
kind of world in which narrative explanation is even worthwhile (2016; 2017). In similar
fashion to Gallie (1964), Beatty takes turning points as essential to the practice of
narrative explanation. In Gallie’s case it seems open to interpret the notion of a “turning
point” as a kind of pragmatic tool in narrative explanation, though, whereas for Beatty,
turning points signify places within a narrative where things really could have gone some
other way. Beatty is committed to contingency per se, not just contingency upon.
Beatty (2016) discusses narrative stories of regret to motivate his picture.
Narrative explanations, on this account, don’t just state that things could have been
otherwise, but also explain what is in terms of what might have been. Regret narratives
do precisely this—they make some essential reference to the historical possibilities that
lay parallel to the actual path, unactualized. And, importantly, these are real possibilities,
not merely epistemic ones. Gould (1989) is right, according to Beatty (2006), to draw
attention to possibility in the first two senses (sensitivity and path dependence). But this
is an incomplete picture of narrative possibility: not only is it the case that the precise
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As he puts it in his (2017), multiple future outcomes must “really be possible”—and this is true at every
step in the narrative.
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distribution of species has downrange consequences for the shape of life’s tree, but even
once those conditions are set, there are many trees which might emerge, and narrative
explanations must make sense of this fact.
I grow skeptical as these notions of possibility tend increasingly toward openness.
Beatty may well be right—turning points, contingencies, possibilities, etc. may be a
crucial element of narrative explanation. If we already know how things will go, what’s
the use of providing a narrative? That said, Ereshefsky and Turner (2020) are right to
point out that this is staking a deep metaphysical claim about the world. Moreover, it’s
not precisely clear how we could get evidence for such a claim. The first grades of
possibility seem sensitive to evidence: we have a pretty clear conception of the
unpredictable evolution of chaotic systems (see Newton 1998), and what it means for
some states to be causally contingent upon others (Wimsatt 2007; Desjardins 2011). It
strikes me that we don’t know how to evidentially evaluate the claim, “History has
actually taken path A, but were we to rewind to just prior to A (and hold history up to
then as constant) and then run forward again, path B might have been actual instead.”
Such claims might make sense on epistemic grounds, but it’s far from clear how to
motivate the view that we should have any ontological commitment to unrealized
histories.

6.2 Telling it like it is
Now we turn our attention to actualist treatments of narrative explanation. The first kind
we’ll call agnosticism (Turner 2007; Ereshefsky 1992; Ereshefsky and Turner 2020), and
the second we’ll call narrative determinism (Hempel 1942).
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The agnostic view advises that we focus on the actual because this is where our
evidential and ontological commitments are best placed. In response to Beatty,
Ereshefsky and Turner (2020) argue that openness is, in fact, irrelevant to the importance
of narrative as a form of explanation. Even if the world were fully deterministic, we
would still need narratives, because narratives assist us in the task of reconstructing
history from imperfect evidence. In the examination of natural history, human history, or
whatever, the physical (or documentary, etc.) evidence can only establish so much—the
rest of the task or reconstruction will require some mixture of projection, interpolation,
and the like. Whether history could have “gone some other way” has no bearing on the
usefulness of narrative as a tool for historical reconstruction.17
The agnostic view, then, essentially says, “Possibility is an undermotivated
concept, and narrative explanation is fine without it, so let’s leave it to one side.”
Narrative determinism has it that the notion of possibility is explanatorily useless. Carl
Hempel (1942) argues that historical explanation should follow precisely the formula of
any other legitimate explanation. That is, the fact to be explained should fall out as a
deductive consequence of the laws of nature and a suitable specification of (empirically
tractable) background conditions (see Hempel and Oppenheim 1948). If you knew
everything about the conditions just prior to some historical fact of interest, there would
be no question as to the occurrence or non-occurrence of the event—its occurrence falls
out as a consequence of all that has come before. Insofar as there’s any indeterminism in
our historical narratives, Hempel takes it that this just reflects imperfect information.
17

Just a note: the notion of “reconstruction” is features prominently in the literature on historical science.
There’s a pretty clear confirmatory aspect to the idea of reconstructing a historical narrative, to my way of
thinking, so the task of reconstruction wears some manner of realist commitment on its sleeve (pace Turner
(2007)). I’ll have more to say about confirmation and inference in the next chapter.
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Narrative explanations with imperfect information, then, are potential explanations or
explanation sketches, but not full-fledged explanations.
My approach in what’s to come will be to urge a kind of ecumenicism on the
possibilist/actualist front. I’ll briefly discuss what I mean by this, and I’ll have much
more to say about it in the next chapter.
Beatty (2016, 2017) is right, I think, to point out that the notion of possibility is
important to the idea of narration, but it’s not clear what work is being done by the notion
of a possible-but-not-actual history (particularly understood as something real). What is
needed, then, is to develop a picture of narrative possibility that saves our ontic
commitments on everything that is essential concerning the notion of possibility, while
leaving the rest open to taste preferences. I’ll call my position the ecological view. The
essential claim of the ecological view is that narrative possibility should be cashed out in
terms of a relation between the capacities of narrative subjects and the affordances
provided by their historical environment (see Pence and Swaim 2018). We can think of
this in terms of Darwin’s (1859) Principle of Divergence. His basic claim here is that
organisms with greater ability to diversify (or specialize, etc.) will thereby be better able
“seize upon the places in the polity of nature” (p. 112). Thinking in terms of evolutionary
narratives, for instance, narrative possibility can be understood in terms of a relation
between features of organisms (capacities) and features of their ecological context
(affordances). The same goes for other historical sciences. Understood in this way, I
argue that we can retain some conception of narrative possibility that respects a robust
notion of “possibility” without appealing to alternate histories. Narrative possibilities
need only facts about actual histories, not ones that might have obtained, but failed to.
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7. Nominalism and structuralism
The fourth and final axis of variation we’ll explore is the nominalist/structuralist axis.
This one is a bit harder to characterize than the others, but by again looking at a handful
of examples, hopefully the distinction will become clear.

7.1 Historical particulars
The key thing to be understood, as regards the nominalist stance, is that they take
historical individuals as explanatorily fundamental. Gallie (1964, p. 50) defends a version
of this view. History, he argues, is the history of particulars. The historical domain
(biological, human, etc.) is made up of the histories of entities, and it seems this is what
historical explanation is trying to capture: history as it pertains to the entities of interest.
Nominalism, then, is a form of historical individualism. Inasmuch as structural elements
enter into our explanatory scheme (social structures, populations, etc.) it’s just as a kind
of bookkeeping device for the real, fine-grained explanations at the level of historical
individuals. This view is harder to cast in terms of grades, but I think it’s possible to tease
out what we can call a hard and a soft version of nominalism. On the hard view, all of the
explanatory power of narrative derives from historical individuals. On the soft version,
narratives cannot be explanatory unless they’re grounded in facts about historical
individuals, although appeal to aggregate or structural relations may enrich narrative
explanations.
I take R.G. Collingwood (1946) as roughly representative of the hard view. He
thinks of history primarily as a kind of “re-enactment” of the past. So, in order to explain
some historical event of interest, it is necessary to understand the action of the narrative
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from the perspective of the narrative subject. Karl Popper (1957) also entertains
nominalist commitments, but for different reasons. To his way of thinking, “social
structures” and the like are just causally inert, and so invoking their explanatory power
seems, in some way, metaphysically spooky. The causal action is taking place at the level
of concrete particulars (e.g. human agents, individual organisms, etc.) and so that’s the
seat of all explanatory power (see Epstein 2015 for discussion).
A more liberal take casts concrete entities as necessary, but still allows for
aggregate and structural relations to do some work for us. Peter Richerson and Robert
Boyd (1992) seem to exemplify this view. We can distinguish between historical
microprocesses and historical macroprocesses (maybe selection acting in a population
versus selection between clades). Richerson and Boyd (ibid.) argue that Popper is
basically right—the causal action takes place at the micro-level. Even so, the manner in
which historical patterns unfold depends in part on structural relations between concrete
entities (densities, spatial distribution, etc.). If that’s true, we need not regard aggregate
and structural relations as explanatorily otiose, even if they’re not fundamental.
I understand the nominalist impulse, even if I think it’s ultimately wrong.
Thinking in terms of mechanisms, as I’ll urge, will help us to see why. What makes
nominalism plausible is its focus on the locus of causal power. But the locus of power is
not always the individual. The mechanistic account of causation that I favor offers an
account of causal production (Glennan 2017). Focusing on productive causal processes,
we’ll see that aggregate and structural level relations are absolutely indispensable to
certain explanatory endeavors. Put simply: biological populations, for example, can
produce effects that biological individuals cannot. The same is true in the rest of the
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sciences (historical or otherwise), and so narrative explanation has to take account of this
fact.

7.2 The power of structures
On the structuralist side of the nominalist/structuralist axis are those arguing that
historical narratives, if explanatory, must appeal to certain structural features and
mechanisms. Kim Sterelny (2016) defends a moderate version of this view that we might
call contextualist. Peter Turchin (2006) defends a more robust version that we’ll just go
ahead and call historical structuralism.
Sterelny’s (2016) view is quite interesting. On his account, the degree to which a
historical narrative is structural depends on the robustness of the causal process driving
the narrative forward. It is in this sense that his view is contextualist. In the context of
fragile causal processes, narrative explanations are less structural and more nominal. In
the context of robust causal processes, narrative explanations are less nominal and more
structural. Sterelny argues that population-level processes are robust in the relevant sense,
in that population processes make no essential reference to any individual within the
population (ibid. 526). Population processes aren’t especially sensitive to what any
particular agent does or decides—nothing much turns on any particular entity’s behavior.
Fragile systems, on the other hand, are highly sensitive to the behaviors of some small
number of entities. Sterelny (ibid.) argues that military operations are fragile in this way.
They are set up such that much of the behavior of the system is determined by a small
command and control structure (generals), and so the thing to be analyzed in military
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history is really the decisions and behaviors of the generals themselves, not the whole
population.
Sterelny offers some interesting insights, but I favor a somewhat more thoroughly
structuralist view. That is, I think even in the case of fragile narrative sequences (as in the
case of military command) there’s a way to think in a more population-based way.
Generally speaking, folks in narrative explanation literature have been taken by the
notion that the proper explanatory relation is between a highly particular (usually causal)
history and some highly particular outcome (see Tucker 1998; Currie 2014). I don’t think
this is quite right. What we should aim for is an account that tells us about historical
types, not historical tokens. We want to know how causal sequences with certain general
features generate certain types of historical outcomes—we want to know, for instance,
how likely a certain kind of outcome was, given that Helmuth von Moltke downsized the
number of troops invading France through Belgium in 1914. The account I’ll advance
invites us to think in structural terms even when reasoning about fragile historical
narratives, in the sense of Sterelny (2016; see also Currie 2014).
My thinking, then, is sympathetic to the work of folks like Peter Turchin (2006).
Historical explanation, he argues, should focus “not on individuals, but on social groups
through time” (ibid.). His approach is focused pretty much entirely on the population
level mechanisms that account for one half of Sterelny’s view. I think this is basically the
right approach, but with some qualification. It’s not the case that individuals don’t
matter—they often matter a great deal (think, again, of Von Moltke the Younger). But in
order to make sense of why some individuals have outsized influence over the course of
history (if they do), we need to situate those individuals in terms of the broader
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mechanisms that produced them. Historical influence isn’t made in a vacuum. Whether in
the context of biology, geology, anthropology, or military history, there are robust
mechanical processes running in the background, which conspire to create the conditions
for certain entities with certain properties to put their thumb on the narrative scale in an
outsized way.

8. Summing up and moving on
The primary aim of this chapter has been to explore, summarize, and organize extant
approaches to narrative explanation. I’ve argued for a conceptual economy of four axes
of variation: (1) a constructivist/realist axis; (2) an interpretivist/causalist axis; (3) a
possibilist/actualist axis; and (4) a nominalist/structuralist axis. It may be that there are
other aspects of narrative explanation that these four categories fail to capture, but these
strike me as adequately capturing the main loci of disagreement in the literature.
I’ve pretty well revealed my cards already, but we might as well make it explicit:
my view of narrative explanation is strongly realist, causalist, and structuralist, and
moderate (‘ecumenical’) on the possibilist/actualist axis.

8.1 Alluding to a positive account
As I said in the introduction to this chapter, I don’t take narrative explanation to be a
substantively different form of explanation than scientific explanations offered in
non-narrative form. Instead, narrative explanations are just a species of model-based
explanation. Narratives are themselves models of mechanistic processes that stand in a
(certain kind of) relation of similarity to their real-world targets (see Weisberg 2013).
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The notion of causal mechanism is central to my account. Stuart Glennan (2017)
develops what he calls a “models first” approach to causal mechanisms, and I’ll adopt
some of his core insights in developing my approach to narrative models. Thinking of
mechanisms in terms of models allows us to think of causal mechanisms in a more
abstract way that gives us more explanatory purchase over the sets of mechanistic
processes that constitute the historical types that my account is meant to capture. This is a
bit of a departure from much previous work on mechanistic explanation, wherein
mechanisms are treated as concrete particulars, and mechanistic explanations are thought
to increase in adequacy as mechanistic details are introduced (see Craver and Kaplan
2011). But by focusing on the abstract mechanism types that the models-first approach
can offer, we can develop a clearer picture of how causal systems can be driven by and
produce certain effects due to persistent structural features (as in the case of
population-level processes). Other views of mechanistic explanation have difficulty
capturing this. So, three things will be accomplished in the coming chapters: first, I will
offer a new account of possibility for explanation in the historical sciences (the ecological
account); second, I will offer a new account of explanation in historical science more
generally (the structural-mechanical account); third, I will provide synthetic remarks that
aim to show how the elements of this theory hang together.
If it starts to appear, as things progress, that my account of narrative doesn’t seem
all that narrativistic, then all is as it should be. The differences between
historical/narrative explanation and other kinds of scientific explanation has been
exaggerated (see Ereshefsky 1992). My account should be a step toward bringing
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narrative explanation much closer to the already massive literature on scientific
explanation as understood more generally.
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Chapter 2: What is Narrative Possibility?
1. Introduction
The idea of narrative in scientific explanations has seen a recent resurgence (see Currie
2019; Roth 2020; Beatty 2017 for a handful of examples). In theorizing about the
applications of narrative explanations, a number of interesting questions emerge. We
might ask, for instance, “What is a narrative,” or, “How do narratives explain?” Indeed,
this is where most of the philosophical action has been, up to now. In recent work, John
Beatty (2016) and Derek Turner and Marc Ereshefsky (2020) have tried to answer
another interesting question: “What are narrative explanations good for?”
One answer to the question of what narratives are good for, according to some
authors, is that they assist us in making sense of possibilities (Beatty 2016; 2017). This is
to say that a good explanation, in narrative form, should in some sense illuminate the
modal space that narrative explanations inhabit.18 There are, however, some deep
disagreements concerning what the appropriate notion of narrative possibility really is,
and how narrative explanations connect to the modal spaces that these explanations are
meant to cover. I think there are basically two approaches represented in the literature up
to now. One approach I term metaphysical, and the other epistemological (I’ll explain
what these are below). Each approach, I argue, provides some crucial insights for
thinking about the nature of narrative possibility, but have some shortcomings as

18

“Modal space” is meant to denote something rather metaphysically minimal here. An anonymous
reviewer has noted that there are many ways in which philosophers speak of modality: logical possibility,
metaphysical possibility, physical possibility, and (perhaps more controversially) biological possibility. I
don’t see narrative possibility as mapping neatly onto any of these more well-known conceptions of
modality. Narrative possibility, contextual as it turns out to be, might then mark out a separate subspace of
modality, marked specifically by its use of central subjects, etc. (which will be explained later) as the
determinants of the relevant modal space.
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concerns what I take as the primary task of an appropriate concept of narrative
possibility: namely, delimiting and illuminating an explanatory modal space.
In what’s to come, I’ll argue for an ecological conception of narrative possibility
that serves just this purpose. This account explicates the concept of narrative possibility
in terms of a relation between the capacities of a narrative subject and the affordances of
its narrative context. I’ll argue that this account captures the most appealing aspects of the
metaphysical and epistemological approaches, and that it succeeds at delimiting the
modal spaces underlying narrative explanations, whereas other accounts do not.

2. Narrative explanation: an operative definition
A quick note concerning the notion of narrative explanation itself is in order. The concept
of narrative explanation has been given many treatments. Some take it to be a form of
“reasons” explanation (e.g. Dray 1957); others have it that narratives are sometimes (or
always) forms of mechanistic explanation (see Glennan 2010; Currie 2014; Swaim 2019);
others take narrative to explain in terms of description of causal (and perhaps non-causal)
event sequences (see Roth 2019; Richards 1992).
I’m broadly sympathetic to the mechanistic approach, which is to say that on my
view, narrative explanations should situate the subject of the narrative within a network
of causal-mechanistic relations, and work to draw explanatory lessons from these
networks. The point of this chapter, however, is not really to defend this or that
conception of narrative explanation specifically, but instead to advance a conception of
narrative possibility that can do work within the context of broader theorizing about
narrative explanation. With that said, I think it best to offer an ecumenical conception of
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narrative explanation that assumes very little concerning philosophical commitments to
any particular account. To begin with, I’ll offer the following, decidedly minimal,
definition of a narrative (similar to that in the opening chapter):

A narrative is a temporally extended sequence of events, involving a central
subject, bound together by some kind of relation.

I grant that this isn’t especially illuminating, but this is because I want the reader not to
be distracted by debates of the nature of narrative explanation itself, which, as I say, is
somewhat removed from the goals of this chapter. While I take this definition to be rather
ecumenical, there is one substantive assumption in this stipulative definition of narrative
worth noting: it takes narratives to be things that are a part of the world. That is,
narratives are things that are discovered, not merely constructed (see Dray 1961 for a
sympathetic take; see Roth 2019 for an opposing take).19 Whether or not this is in fact the
case is not something that I’ll argue for directly, but it does map to my previous
comments about narratives (at least in the natural sciences and the like) as primarily
mechanistic. But perhaps these worries can be somewhat offset by offering the following
(stipulative) definition of narrative explanation:

19

The most obvious exception to this, perhaps, is literary narratives. I grant that some narratives are harder
than others to fit into this seemingly ontic framework, but I think there’s a sense in which even literary
narratives have an ontic element. Literary narratives, for instance, try to illuminate parts of the human
condition through the use of fictional characters. The fictional characters, then, can be said to be something
like fictional “models” of things that are very much a part of the world; namely, us.
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A narrative explanation involves a temporally extended sequence of events,
involving a central subject, bound together by some kind of relation, and by virtue
of that relation, is apt to be recounted in such a way as to provide explanatory
understanding.

This may, I hope, ameliorate some of the concerns as regards the nature of
narrative itself, as given in the minimal definition of a narrative. When we move from our
stipulative definition of narrative to our stipulative definition of narrative explanation,
we’re granted some wiggle room as to what kinds of things ultimately make explanations
explanatory or illuminating, which is certainly the more philosophically interesting
question.20 In any case, I take it that the kind of relation that is going to be of interest will
be one that relates the central subjects of narrative explanations and affordances given by
their narrative environment in the appropriate way. Central subjects are spatiotemporally
continuous entities (or perhaps processes)21 around which narratives are woven (persons,
organisms, populations, genes, etc.). Affordances are just those background features of
the central subject’s environment that render a narrative pathway either open or closed. I
will have much more to say about this in what’s to come.

20

The relation doing explanatory work may be of an ontic sort, or it may be primarily epistemic, for
instance. There is room for variation. How this is so will become clearer later on in the chapter.
21
I simply flag here that I assume no ontology; entities, processes, etc. may be taken as ontologically
fundamental, and I stake no claim as to which ontology is the right one.
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3. Outlining extant approaches
In this section I’ll take a closer look at the views on narrative possibility that are most
prominent in the literature up to now—the metaphysical and epistemological approaches.
First, I’ll discuss the metaphysical approach, most forcefully defended by John Beatty
and Eric Desjardins (Beatty 2017; Beatty 2017; Desjardins 2011; Beatty and Desjardins
2009). The key insight of the metaphysical approach, I’ll argue, is that theories of
narrative explanation need to resist the trivialization of the notion of possibility (an idea
which I’ll explain shortly). Then I’ll turn my attention to the epistemological approach, as
defended by Derek Turner and Marc Ereshefsky (Turner 2007; Ereshefsky and Turner
2020). Their key insight is that we should resist metaphysical overextension when
theorizing the role of possibility in narrative explanations.

3.1 The metaphysical approach
Recall our motivating question: “What are narratives good for?” We said that one answer
to that question is that narratives should do some work toward helping us make sense of
possibilities. This isn’t a new insight. W.B. Gallie (1964) argues, for instance, that what
narrative explanations do (in part) is they situate our understanding of narrative outcomes
relative to salient “turning points” in a narrative sequence. Turning points are something
like crucial events, but they’re also more than that. Turning points are locations within a
narrative structure where the force of the narrative seems to push events along one
trajectory, even though it strikes us as entirely possible that things might have gone some
other way (Gallie 1964; 1955; Beatty 2016). We’re able to see how it is that what
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happened hinged upon (or was “contingent upon”) some crucial events in the past causal
history of the narrative (see Beatty 2006; Gould 1989).
This notion of turning points, then, allows us to speak in terms of the contingency
of events. Further, following S.J. Gould (1989) and John Beatty and Eric Desjardins
(2009) we can distinguish between two kinds of contingency: contingency upon (already
mentioned above) and contingency per se.22 As we’ve seen, possibility in the sense of
contingency upon just means that some later event is possible only by dint of some earlier
event’s occurrence. Evolutionary narratives, for instance, often involve contingency upon,
since giving an account of the emergence of some adaptive trait will involve accounting
for the features of populations, organisms, and selective regimes that made its emergence
possible. Contingency per se is something stronger than this. The per se conception of
contingency is committed to something like “genuine openness”—that is, this stronger
sense of contingency holds that there really are alternate histories that might have
occurred, even though they didn’t.
The weaker notion (contingency upon) is fairly uncontroversial—the popularity of
counterfactual theories of causal explanation (e.g. Lewis 1973; Woodward 2002) attests
to this fact. This notion of possibility, though, might strike some as relatively thin (at least
in certain contexts). Beatty and Desjardins (Beatty 2016; Beatty 2017; Beatty and
Desjardins 2009) argue forcefully that the proper way to think about narrative possibility
is in terms of contingency per se. This is to say that according to their view, narrative

22

For more helpful discussion on contingency (and especially its role in evolutionary theory) I direct the
reader to Beatty (1993) for a thorough (and canonical) treatment. It’s also worth noting that Beatty and
Desjardins (2009) point helpfully to a potential confusion in Gould (1989), which is that he sometimes also
slips into talking about contingency as something like “sensitivity to initial conditions,” without really
registering the fact that this sense of contingency is different and distinct from the others.
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possibility involves a commitment to the reality of unrealized historical outcomes as a
part of the world’s real structure (Beatty 2017).
This brings us back to Gallie’s (1964) notion of turning points. Narrative turning
points, recall, are events within a narrative sequence where the narrative breaks in one
direction, while it seems it need not have done so. That is, things could have gone some
other way (i.e. some other outcome was possible). On the metaphysical view, we should
read this as a literal part of the world’s structure. There really are, according to the
metaphysical view, other ways that the world could have been. Indeed, if this weren’t the
case, narrative explanation would not even be a worthwhile endeavor (Beatty 2016).
According to this view, narratives explain, at least in part, by making reference to
unrealized outcomes (Beatty 2017). Stated another way, the significance of narrative
outcomes can be seen only by contextualizing them in terms of other possible outcomes
that weren’t realized. Beatty (2016) uses “regret narratives” (as mentioned before) as
paradigm examples of this core insight. Regret narratives are just what they sound
like—reflections on the part of some central character with respect to some set of
decisions that they regret having made for some reason or another (think of It’s a
Wonderful Life, for instance). In such narratives, the significance of what has happened to
the narrative subject can be made sense of only by referencing or alluding to some
alternate circumstances. That is, while the world turned out to be one way, the subject
sees that it could have been another, if only she’d made a different decision at some
crucial juncture.
A similar kind of reasoning might apply to natural historical narratives.
Explaining the emergence of some novel biological trait can only be done, on this view,
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by situating what happened (the emergence of bipedal locomotion in hominins, say) in
terms of other evolutionary outcomes that failed to obtain (even though they might have).
The explanation surely involves some crucial turning points:23 the emergence of certain
selective regimes, the break-off of some founder population of early primates, the
occurrence of some fortuitous mutations, etc. But crucially, according to the metaphysical
view, there was never any point at which the realized outcome was determined or
necessitated. The unrealized possibilities are real possibilities, and if that weren’t true, it
wouldn’t make any sense to offer explanations in narrative form.
Narrative explanations, recall, are supposed to be especially suited to the task of
making sense of possibility. This is what narratives are supposed to be “good for” (Beatty
2016). If possibility weren’t baked into the structure of the world, then narrative
explanations would be effectively reducible to something like Deductive-Nomological
explanations (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948).24 In a deterministic world, they argue,
nothing would be worth narrating, and narrative forms of explanation would have no real
purchase. The high degree of contingency and stochasticity in biological and evolutionary
phenomena, however, seems to lend credence to the idea that the world supports narrative
explanations in at least some contexts (Beatty 2006; Beatty 2017; Millstein 2000; Gould
1989). Insofar as that’s the case, it must be that the world’s structure itself is the kind of

23

While it’s common to think about narratives as involving “turning points” it has lately been recognized
by some (Currie correspondence; Turner correspondence) that some narratives may be narratives of stasis.
Perhaps evolutionary equilibria of various sorts may be the subjects of narrative explanations, for instance.
This strikes me as plausible, but I have nothing to say about such narratives here.
24
See also Hempel (1942). There he explicitly argues that historical explanations are typically just
“explanatory sketches” that, if filled out, would have the form of DN explanations. The problem is just that
we don’t typically have the information to do the labor of “filling out.”
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thing that is narratable. According to the metaphysical view, narrative explanations are
effective because possibility is baked into the structure of the world.

3.2 The epistemological approach
The epistemological approach to narrative possibility tends to emphasize the role of
evidential underdetermination (Turner 2007; Ereshefsky and Turner 2020).25 That is, the
epistemological approach holds that the reason we speak about possibility in narrative
contexts at all is because several historical sequences appear compatible with our
evidential situation. “Possibility” refers to a certain state of affairs concerning our
knowledge situation, not necessarily a special set of facts about the structure of the world
(as the metaphysical approach would have it).26
The idea here is relatively straightforward. In order to explain some historical
phenomenon, p, we need to construct a narrative sequence that properly accounts for it.
In the case of natural history this presumably involves reconstructing a causal history, h,
leading to p, such that p is a consequence of the causal influences constituting h. One way
of generating explanatory narratives like h is to construct them from a set of evidential
traces, E (see Turner 2007, Cleland 2011). Underdetermination, however, rears its head
rather quickly. For any p and its attendant traces E, we can generate an equally well
supported but strictly incompatible explanatory narrative, h’ (Turner 2007; Swaim
25

Although I take it that the epistemological approach is informed in deep ways by problems of local
underdetermination (as in Turner (2007)), this is not their sole concern by any means. They overlap in
important ways with the explanatory concerns of metaphysical theorists—selection of central subjects,
narrative trajectory, etc. There will likely be some disagreement over what makes some selection of a
central subject, for example, “fit” for a particular explanatory task, but still, explanatory concerns overlap.
26
It may be that the distinction here is not absolute. As mentioned elsewhere, we should ultimately think
about these approaches as poles between which positions may vary. Whereas Ereshefsky and Turner (2020)
count as having an epistemological view by my reading, they are less so than, for instance Roth (2020). The
former are in some sense “tied to the world’s structure,” but certainly less so than Beatty and others.
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2019).27 So, given some evidential traces, we have a set of possible explanatory narratives
to choose from.
What this demonstrates, according to the epistemological conception of
possibility, is that narrative forms of explanation can be useful even if the world is
deterministic (Ereshefsky and Turner 2020; Swaim 2019). This runs counter to the claim
advanced by the metaphysical theorists, who hold that some form of openness in the
world is essential to the usefulness of narrative explanation.28 Their claim was that
narrative explanations reduce to D-N explanations if the world lacks the openness they
claim for it.
But considerations of underdetermination and the ways in which scientists
negotiate these problems seems to show that the metaphysical theorists’ worries are
somewhat misplaced. Cleland (2011), for instance, argues that what historical scientists
do is set out in search of “smoking guns” that can serve to break the tie between
purportedly equivalent narratives. Dray (1951) argues that successful explanation turns
on bringing historical events under their appropriate concepts. Adrian Currie (2019)
argues that narratives perform a kind of “situating” function that allows us to see how the
events to be explained stand in their proper historical relations to preceding ones. None of
these explanatory strategies seem reducible to the D-N theory, and all of them seem
27

This is not meant to be a strict definition of the epistemological position. Many weaker versions of the
view are available and plausible on the epistemic approach. A proponent of the epistemological view might
commit only to the claim that at some narrative turning point, although things went down narrative path A,
for all we know, things might have just as easily gone down path B (I thank an anonymous reviewer for
pointing this out). This stronger version that emphasises underdetermination, however, helps to highlight
the stakes of the debate in a rather stark way, one which I think is helpful for expository purposes. I do not,
however, bind the epistemological theorist to it.
28
Beatty and Desjardins (2009) seem to think that “openness” is required in the strongest sense—that future
states are not causally determined by previous states. I think it’s possible (and preferable) to go for
something weaker than this, where we might talk about probabilistic causation without making any
commitments to indeterminacy (as in Strevens (2008, Ch. 10).
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perfectly consistent with our being in a fully deterministic world. So, the epistemological
theorist claims, it is enough to talk about possibility in terms of our evidential situation,
and any claims that extend our notion of possibility further are philosophically otiose.
3.3 Some concluding thoughts and allusions to what’s ahead
On the face of things, I’ve constructed two categories of theorizing about narrative
possibility: a metaphysical approach, and an epistemological one. More properly
speaking, I’ve chosen representative examples of poles along a continuum of possible
positions, the metaphysical pole being exemplified by the likes of Beatty and Desjardins
(2009), and the epistemological pole being exemplified by Ereshefsky and Turner (2020).
Given that our concept of narrative possibility should importantly inform our theories of
narrative explanation, we want to be sure that the concept we advance can support our
explanatory tasks in the appropriate ways (Currie correspondence). In some cases,
narrative explanatory tasks may involve some degree of conceptual projection over an
explanandum (see Roth 2020, Ch. 3).29 In other cases our explanatory tasks might
demand that we focus more intently on the concrete material structure of the world as we
find it (e.g. Salmon 1989). While my sympathies will skew ultimately in the direction of
respecting the concrete material structure of the world, it is still sensible to say that a
good account of narrative possibility will respect some degree of explanatory pluralism,
appropriately restricted.
In the next few sections I’ll develop what I call an ecological conception of
narrative possibility. The basic idea of this account is that narrative possibility should be
29

Roth takes this notion of projection to hold in a very strong sense; historical events do not exist, on his
view, until we’ve put them under our conceptual schemes. I do not share this view, especially in the strong
sense argued by Roth. A lightly weaker version of this view can be found in Chapman and Wylie (2015).
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viewed as a relation that holds between the capacities of a narrative subject and the
affordances offered by the environment in which the narrative subject is situated. I’ll
show that by adopting this account, we can retain a solid commitment to a relatively
robust notion of possibility as part of the structure of the world, while resisting the
metaphysical overextension that worries the epistemological theorists. This account paves
the way for good narrative explanations by delimiting the modal space that is properly
representative of the concept of “narrative possibility.” This delimiting function proves
flexible enough to support a reasonable pluralism about narrative forms of explanation
without being so flexible as to be devoid of philosophical content.

4. Motivating the ecological account: Darwin and the Principle of Divergence
In this section I’ll give a broad outline of the ecological approach to narrative possibility,
so as to illuminate its underlying motivation. As an example of something that outlines
the kind of narrative possibility I’m pursuing, and its broader relation to narrative
explanation, I’ll turn to Charles Darwin and his “Principle of Divergence” as an
instructive example. While many accounts of narrative explanation proper (which is to
say, accounts of explanation rather than some aspect of it, such as narrative possibility)
tend to focus more narrowly on concrete narrative subjects (i.e. concrete individuals), the
rather abstract character of Darwin’s Principle of Divergence allows us to see that the
ecological conception of narrative possibility has wide application over many different
classes of potential narrative subjects.
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4.1 Possibility, explanation, and Darwin’s Principle of Divergence
Darwin’s Principle of Divergence (PD) is exemplary of the sort of ecological relation that
my account of narrative possibility seeks to exploit. What, then, is PD? Darwin (1859)
writes the following:
The principle, which I have designated by this term, is of high importance on my
theory, and explains, as I believe, several important facts. In the first place,
varieties, even strongly marked ones, though having somewhat the character of
species—as is shown by the hopeless doubts in many cases how to rank
them—yet certainly differ from each other far less than do good and distinct
species. Nevertheless, according to my view, varieties are species in the process
of formation, or are, as I have called them, incipient species.
Now what we want to know, according to Darwin (1859, p. 111), is how the relatively
small differences between varieties can become “augmented” into the larger differences
that prevail between proper species. There is, here, a kind of evolutionary imperative at
play—populations must diversify. Mere varieties, being so close in physiological
character, will have to compete with their parent species (or variety) for a broad range of
resources, including food, habitat, and perhaps mating opportunities (see Pence and
Swaim 2018, p. 444). So, according to PD, “[…] the more diversified the descendants
from any one species become in structure, constitution, and habits, by so much will they
be better enabled to seize upon the many and widely diversified places in the polity of
nature, and so be enabled to increase in numbers” (Darwin 1859, p. 112, emphasis
added).
How can we explicate Darwin’s PD so as to shed some light on the notion of
narrative possibility? It’s interesting to note here that many of the biologists who have
analyzed Darwin’s PD have argued that it has no special explanatory power of its own
within his theory of natural selection (see Mayr 1984). Divergence, it is argued,
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completely reduces to the effects of differential selection and reproduction. So, whereas
Darwin took PD to be in some sense independent of the action of natural selection, in
fact, natural selection (esp. competitive exclusion) alone can do all the necessary
explanatory work.
I don’t want to offer a knock-down argument against this interpretation of PD
here, as that would take us a bit afield of the overall aim of this chapter. That said, how
one understands the explanatory value of PD will at least in part hinge on what one takes
to be a good explanation for some set of biological phenomena.30 The reason Darwin
understood PD as the “keystone” of his theory (Darwin 1859) is that he understands the
aims of his theory as deeply ecological (Kohn 2009). What stands in need of explanation
(at least in part) is the rich diversity of life, and how it comes to fill out the spaces in the
“polity” or “economy” of nature in precisely the way it has. This being the case, the
diverse structure of life’s radiative bursts makes reference to both the features of
organisms and populations, and the background structure of nature. Organisms must have
some set of features that allows them to move from one region of nature’s economy into
another, and nature must afford for the possibility of doing so (see Pearce 2009; Pence
and Swaim 2018).
In relatively broad strokes, then, we can see what PD offers as a kind of window
into the ecological view of narrative possibility I’m advancing. PD offers a thoroughly
ecological view of how evolutionary change proceeds. The focus is on those features of
organisms and populations which better enable them to diversify and radiate, but this is
30

I don’t mean to be restricting my account of narrative to biological phenomena. Darwin’s PD is being
used as an expository tool to help in illuminating what this ecological account looks like, so for
convenience, I’m speaking here in terms of biology.
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only possible if the environments in which they’re embedded allow for those features to
operate as a mechanism of action. But this kind of explanatory schema, with a structure
of environmental affordances outlining what can be considered as broadly possible for a
subject, can apply over a wide range of explanatory schemas. We need not speak in broad
terms concerning radiative bursts and the like, but may instead, with equal justice, speak
in terms of particular organisms, evolutionary lineages, or any other level of biological
organization, so long as we can find a way to pick out a unit of analysis at that level of
organization such that it can plausibly be thought of as the subject of a narrative. There is
some reason to think that this ecumenicism about narrative subjects is plausible (see
Glennan 2018, pp. 83-4).

4.2 Wrapping up
In this section I gave an example from the history of science to try to outline the basic
shape of what an ecological account of narrative possibility might look like. Now I’ll turn
my attention to the nuts and bolts of the account. In the next two sections I’ll offer an
account of capacities and an account of affordances, as these are the two key elements of
the conception of narrative possibility being advanced. After I’ve done this, I’ll try to
provide some synthetic comments concerning how these elements work together to
provide a compelling and philosophically appealing account of narrative possibility.

5. Central subjects and their capacities
Part of the task of constructing a positive account of capacities is to give an account of
those things which hold the relevant capacities in the first place. Ereshefsky and Turner
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(2020) argue that part of what’s needed in philosophical treatments of historical and
narrative explanation is to return to some of the work from the 1950s, 60s, and
70s—especially the work of people like David Hull (1975) and W.B. Gallie (1955; 1964).
Their key contributions to discussions of narrative are the notions of “central subjects”
(esp. Hull 1975), and “directionality” (esp. Gallie 1955). Both of these elements of
narrative will figure in my account of narrative possibility, but I’ll differ with Hull,
Gallie, and Ereshefsky and Turner on some important particulars. I’ll start by giving brief
conceptual sketches of central subjects and narrative directionality as we receive them
from Hull and Gallie. I’ll then go on to offer a slightly different view that connects these
concepts more closely with the relevant capacities of narrative subjects.

5.1 Central subjects
What, then, are central subjects, and why are they important? According to Hull, “The
role of the central subject is to form the main strand around which the historical narrative
is woven” (1975, p. 255). Hull argues that the function of the central subject is to tell us
what the narrative is about in the first place. Assuming that we can decompose the world
atomistically along whatever lines we like, one immediate consequence is that the world
is composed of a broad range of histories. By picking out a central subject, we get some
traction on how to go about the task of constructing a narrative, as we now have a point
of reference that can integrate the relevant facts in the appropriate way (Hull 1975;
Ereshefsky and Turner 2020).
A question immediately arises: what kinds of things can be the central subjects of
historical narratives? According to Hull, the most important feature of central subjects is
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that they are individuals. As individuals, central subjects provide for the basic continuity
that Hull argues a proper conception of narrative demands. Even as particular features of
the central subject might change as a narrative sequence unfolds, the narrative is still
about the same historical individual.
The key to explicating the notion of a central subject is to define those features
that make an historical individual one and the same individual through time, while
distinguishing these features from others they may have (Hull 1975, p. 260). Chief among
these central-subject-making features are continuity in space and continuity in time. By
selecting individuals who are continuous in this fashion, we are in a position to say
something meaningful about the historical development of a central subject relative to
some set of events that make up its history. We can speak, for instance, of a gene as a
central subject, because even as its function may change over the course of its
evolutionary history, we can point to the change inducing events that would alter its
function within varying environments given particular mutations. A gene can be a central
subject because it is spatiotemporally continuous, and it persists under conditions of
change. However, a gene for a particular trait is not an historical individual, and so does
not qualify as a central subject. As Hull says, we can talk about genes as central subjects,
but not genes for albinism. Once a gene for albinism has its function altered, it is no
longer a gene for albinism, so considered according to its function, a gene is not an
historical individual.
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5.2 Directionality
As noted above, another key element of narrative explanations is that they rely on a sense
of directionality with respect to their explanatory targets—narrative explanations depend
on temporal asymmetry (Gould 1989; Beatty 2006; Gallie 1964). In Hull’s case, this is
partly taken care of just by giving a correct account of central subjects. Narratives are
“woven around” central subjects, which is to say that the selection of the central subject,
under the right conditions (involving spatial and temporal continuity), will shed light on
the events that indicate the overall trajectory of the narrative sequence.
It might help to offer a concrete example. Paleobiologists are (sometimes)
interested in investigating macroevolutionary trends in the overall history of life. The
very notion of “trend” already indicates that there is an overall directionality to at least
some of the questions paleobiologists are interested in. One such question might be the
evolution of body size within evolutionary lineages. Increase in the average body size of
mammals since the K-T extinction, for instance, is a pretty well-established trend.
Mammals (or some subset of them) can, considered as a clade or monophyletic set, fulfill
the role of the central subject, as the development of mammals forms a spatiotemporally
continuous series over its history. Having established a central subject, we can ask further
questions, the answers to which will serve to construct a narrative, which will explicate
the directionality of the historical sequence. We might, for instance, find that average
body size increase is just a consequence of a random walk away from a lower bound on
mammalian body size.31 If there exists a lower bound that constrains the minimal possible
31

The statistical abstraction of average body size is not to be thought of as the central subject. It is, rather,
still the mammalian clade, with the statistical abstraction working as a bookkeeping device that we might
use to capture certain facts about potential narrative directions.
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size for any mammal (which seems plausible) then you would expect to see some average
increase just as a matter of course (Turner 2011). Or it might be that there’s some
selective pressure that drives adaptive radiations of animals with larger bodies, on
average, than their ancestors. This need not be settled here. The point is just that once we
assume the demand for directionality in narrative explanations, we see how crucial the
selection of central subjects becomes. In the example above we need to tell a story about
body size increase, so we know something about the general direction that the narrative
will assume, but a random walk from a lower bound is likely to produce a narrative with
a much different overall structure (for instance, one may have a causal structure while the
other may be non-causal) than a story involving strong selection for particular traits like
size.

5.3 Central subjects, directionality, and capacities
Having noted the centrality of central subjects and directionality to theoretical treatments
of narrative explanation, it is natural to wonder what it is about the concept of a central
subject that makes it capable of occupying this integrative role within the development of
an historical narrative. Hull (1975) argues that the properties that matter have mainly to
do with spatial and temporal continuity. I certainly have no objection to these properties
of central subjects as important, but it strikes me that this treatment of the “central
subject” concept is incomplete..
Hull claims (plausibly) that organisms are paradigm examples of historical
individuals. As is frequently pointed out, individual organisms change their constituent
parts over their histories, but nonetheless remain the same historical individual, at least in
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part due to properties of spatial and temporal continuity. But it seems that these
continuities aren’t the only properties that matter as regards our concept of narrative
explanation, and, more importantly for our current discussion, narrative possibility. Hull
(1975) and Ereshefsky and Turner (2020) urge that central subjects of narratives persist
under relations of change, and this fact is a key constituent of any proper conception of
narrative explanation. But central to any discussion of narrative explanation is a proper
notion of narrative possibility, which is the topic of our discussion here. But once we’ve
recognized this fact, we’re forced to also recognize that we need to have a theory that
properly accounts for the ability of our central subjects to undergo change. That is, if
we’re committed to the claim that central subjects persist under certain change relations,
we’re already admitting that change is integral to our account. What we need, then, is a
way to talk about central subjects that respects the demand for treating them as spatially
and temporally continuous, while still being able to explicate the sense in which they can
undergo change, while retaining their historical individuality.
This, I think, is where capacities do their work. What do I mean by “capacity”?
Capacities are just those properties of an object that dispose it toward (or away) from
some behavior (or pattern of behavior) (see Mumford 1998; Mumford and Lill Anjum
2011). To turn to a classic example, we say that salt has a disposition toward dissolving
when placed in water. The question, then, is why salt is disposed to behave in such a way;
the answer is that it possesses certain chemical and structural properties that enable it to
discharge its disposition to dissolve—loosely bound electrons, and so on (see Strevens
2008).
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We’re now in a position to say some rather interesting things about central
subjects and the narratives we weave around them. Let’s return to the idea of genes as
central subjects. Recall Hull’s (1975) argument that genes may be thought of as central
subjects, but “genes for albinism” cannot, since genes for albinism lack the kind of
spatiotemporal continuity required for a proper conception of central subjects. This seems
right as far as it goes, but it seems to leave underanalyzed the thing that was interesting
about any potential narrative in the first place: how it is that the gene in question,
previously functioning as a gene for x, changed and became a gene for albinism. This
invites us to think not just in terms of the spatiotemporal continuity of the central subject,
but also in terms of structural features inherent in that subject, which allow for it to
change, while nonetheless retaining its historical individuality. In the case of the gene for
albinism, we can point, perhaps, to certain facts about mutation rate, availability (or lack
of availability) to selection, and its location relative to other genes as importantly
influential to its capacity for change. And as regards its historical identity, we can point to
ancestral genes and find that they’re in fact evolutionary orthologs. This strikes me as the
right way to think about central subjects. We respect the sensible demand for
spatiotemporal continuity and narrative directionality, while also tackling the subject of
narrative change—and in doing so, we’re one step closer to a full analysis of narrative
possibility.

6. Affordances
I said above that my approach to narrative possibility involves two key elements (perhaps
in addition to some of the features of extant accounts from Hull and the like)—capacities
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and affordances. We have some sense of what capacities are: they’re just those features of
a central subject that dispose it toward (or away) from the manifestation of some state or
property of interest. There’s nothing especially mysterious here. We’ve yet to touch on
the notion of an affordance with any depth or precision, however. That will be the task of
this section.

6.1 Recalling Darwin’s PD
In my earlier (somewhat loose) remarks on my ecological approach to narrative
possibility, I mentioned Darwin’s PD as a useful motivating example for what this
conception of possibility can accomplish. Darwin thought that the explanatory target of
his principle was the rich diversity of life on Earth, and in order to fully explain it, it is
necessary to have a robustly ecological view of the processes that drive diversification
(Kohn 2009; Worster 1994).
By explicating the notion of something’s (e.g. an organism) having a capacity,
we’ve really only explicated half of the concept of what it means for some narrative
pathway to be “possible” for it. Darwin’s PD invites us to realize why this is the case. In
the PD it is not just the features of the organism that provide the explanation for the
diversification of lifeforms; rather, it is in part because nature is structured in a certain
way that creatures can diversify at all (Pence and Swaim 2018).
It might help to think about things in somewhat more concrete terms. Let’s
assume that some species, S, is under a selective regime, and that the selective regime in
question is inducing anagenic speciation over some subpopulation, S*, of the species.
According to PD, this new species, S* (or “incipient species,” etc.) is made better off by
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an ability to diversify further away (morphologically) from its ancestor, as a less
diversified variant will face too much competition from its parent population. But this can
only be made sense of in terms of some background structural features of the “Economy”
or “Polity” of nature. In order to properly understand what is happening, it is necessary to
see that what is possible for an organism or a population is only fully accounted for once
we see that the relation of interest is a relation between the features that organisms have,
and the background structure in which they’re embedded. The natural world has a
structure, and what is possible in terms of evolutionary pathways (i.e. narratives) is to be
made sense of in terms of relations that hold between the properties of biological systems
(capacities) and the environmental backdrop (affordances). Importantly, the state of this
relation, for any given central subject, is not fixed. Indeed, this is what makes things so
interesting.
It may be that in some ancestral state of a population, the set of possible
evolutionary outcomes consists of some set {E1, E2, E3}. In any realistic case the
possibilities are going to be much more numerous, but this will suffice for a toy example.
Now suppose that a mutant variant for some gene controlling body segmentation (or
whatever) spreads through the population, constricting the set of possible body types that
are evolvable for the population in its current ecological context. Given a few generations
of reproductive output, we can say, perhaps, that E1 is ruled out as a biological
possibility. But the others remain, and it may be that the situation is such that some new
pathway, E4 becomes possible for our toy population. The point is just that the situation
is fluid, and tracking the state of the relation between the capacities of the central subject
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and the features of its environment are central to the concept of narrative possibility being
advanced.
In Darwin’s (1859) words, PD tracks the ability of organisms and populations to
“seize upon” one or some of the many places in the “polity of nature.” We’re no longer
inclined to speak in precisely this sort of language, but the imagery nonetheless latches
onto something important—that the world has a structure which can be exploited; that
there is something to be seized upon in the first place. Which parts of the structure of
nature will be exploitable depends in part on just what capacities our central subjects
have, and this is, according to the ecological view, the nature of narrative possibility.

7. Putting things together
At this point it seems like a good idea to put together some synthetic remarks on the
ecological account, and to recapitulate some of the key points of the chapter so far.
Having done that, we’ll be in a good position to discuss some potential objections to the
account in the next section.

7.1 A brief restatement of the account
The ecological account introduces two key concepts to the conversation over the nature
of narrative possibility: capacities and affordances. Hull (1975), Gallie (1964), and
Ereshefsky and Turner (2020) stress the importance of central subjects and directionality
for any account of narrative explanation. Given that narrative possibility features as a
component of our theory of narrative explanation, it seems sensible to take central
subjects and directionality as important elements of our treatment of narrative possibility.
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What we find is that the introduction of these notions of “capacity” and
“affordance” allows us to say some interesting things about narrative possibility. We can
track possibility as a relation between the capacities of central subjects and their
ecological context (broadly construed). For some outcome or pathway to be narratively
possible, we just mean that that outcome or pathway is consistent with the relevant
properties of our central subjects and their environment. The nature of this relation is
liable to change over time—what is possible for some central narrative subject at some
earlier time may not be possible at some later time, and vice versa. The properties of
central subjects may change, as might their environment, and so certain narrative
possibilities may be opened up or foreclosed upon as a narrative sequence progresses (see
Beatty 2017).

7.2 Back to initial comments on motivation
In an earlier part of this chapter, I motivated my account by situating it within a broader
debate between what I called metaphysical and epistemological approaches to narrative
possibility. The metaphysical approach takes possibility to be a real part of the world’s
structure. An important part of the function of narrative explanation, on this account, is to
make sense of the structure of possibility. On the epistemological account, our concept of
possibility is just a consequence of our knowledge situation. Possibility simply relates to,
for instance, evidential underdetermination. Narrative explanation, then, can be properly
motivated independently of metaphysical questions concerning the structure of possibility
in the world. With the ecological position on the table, we’re now in a position to
elaborate on these points a bit.
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As already noted, I think metaphysical conception and the epistemological one
latch onto some important points. The metaphysical theorist is right to think that our
concept of possibility should treat it as something that’s baked into the structure of the
world, while the epistemological theorist is right to resist metaphysical overextension.
The question, then, is how to thread the needle appropriately.
The ecological approach threads the needle by providing an account that jettisons
the most metaphysically controversial bits of the more robustly metaphysical approach,
while being less metaphysically deflationary than the epistemological approach. The
most controversial aspects of the metaphysical approach were its seeming commitment to
the reality of unrealized historical branches, and causal indeterminism. The ecological
approach involves no such commitments. On the ecological approach, we track a relation
between the properties of central subjects and the environment in this world. All of the
facts concerning what is possible are merely facts that can (at least in principle) be read
off of the actual history of the central subject. There is some real sense in which
“alternate histories” or “potential alternate histories” exist on the ecological account, but
this is because there are several histories that are consistent with the relation being
tracked by the account.
So, by locating our concept of narrative possibility in a this-worldly relation
between the capacities of central subjects and the affordances provided by their
environment (or context, etc.), we can retain some of the best insights from each of the
aforementioned approaches. “Possibility” is not banished from the world or relegated to
our evidential situation, but we also do not have to commit to metaphysically
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controversial ideas like causal indeterminism or the “reality” of unrealized causal
histories.
One might think, however, that I’ve simply traded in one set of metaphysically
dubious claims for another. While we may not have to talk about “unrealized causal
histories” and the like, we are now committed to the existence of capacities and
affordances, and these may not be metaphysically innocent notions. I’ll look at this
problem in a later section, as I turn my attention to some potential objections, and my
replies to them.

8. Narrative possibility and explanatory modal spaces
I made a promise that I’ve yet to follow through on. I said that a major benefit of the
ecological conception of narrative possibility is that it appropriately delimits the modal
spaces that our explanatory tasks are understood to cover. Moreover, it does so in ways
that the metaphysical and epistemological approaches fail to do.
In the next section I’ll have some more comments on the salience of context, but
some comments on the importance of context to explanatory tasks also bear mentioning
here. There are several senses in which we might say that explanatory tasks are relative to
a certain context. It may be that the kind of explanation given is sensitive to the kind of
question asked (e.g. Garfinkel 1981), or the explanatory aims or investigators (e.g. Giere
1999), or because of the kinds of practices that make up the specific discipline an
investigator inhabits (e.g. Potochnik 2017). Whether any of these specific conceptions of
context sensitivity is right or wrong is not a point at discussion here—it seems clear,
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however, that it must be right that explanatory tasks are in some sense sensitive to
context.
A major theme in the literature on scientific explanation are debates centered
around epistemic as opposed to ontic accounts of explanation (see Salmon 1984). This
debate is well-worn enough that it need not be recapitulated here (and it will form some
of the main conceptual strands of the next chapter, anyway). It isn’t too much of a stretch
to say that, as regards narrative explanations in particular, the metaphysical approach to
narrative possibility will likely be tied to ontic narrative explanations, and the
epistemological approach tied to epistemic theories of narrative explanation. The
problem, as I see it, is that narrative explanations, depending on context, will exemplify a
tendency to vary between ontic and epistemic explanatory concerns.
Consider two kinds of cases that seem apt for narratization: the evolutionary
emergence of a novel trait, and a significant decision made by some important historical
actor. Popular examples of the former are things like the evolution of novel metabolic
abilities in laboratory evolution experiments (see Parke 2014), and the latter might
include Julius Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon. In the former (biological) context, we
want a conception of possibilities that maps onto the causal structure of the world. That
is, the thing we’re trying to explain, via narrative, is something that is clearly well within
the causal web of the world, and so the space of possibilities should be tracking that
structure in (at least approximately) the right way. In the latter (human historical) context,
it is at least less precisely the case that what we’re dealing with is straightforwardly a part
of the world’s causal web (though I don’t actually think that’s quite right). As many
philosophers of history (Roth 2020; Mink 1987; Goldstein 1996) have noted, historical
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explanation (here in the sense of explaining events in human history) involves a great
deal of cognitive projection.32 The exact sense in which this is the case will vary from
author to author, but in general, the claim is that for certain kinds of narrative explanatory
tasks, the explanations are very much objects of human construction. This may be the
case for a number of disciplines besides history—sociology, psychology, and
anthropology might have similar explanatory practices (see Chapman and Wylie 2016,
Ch. 1 for instance). While I don’t go in for a fully constructivist account of explanation
for any empirical discipline, (as, for instance, Roth (2020; 2017) seems to do with
history), it does seem plausible that there might be constructive components to historical
or anthropological explanation that aren’t present in evolutionary explanation. This is
because these disciplines perhaps deal with facts about mentality in addition to
materiality (Chapman and Wylie 2016).
The metaphysical approach to narrative possibility is not going to be well-suited
to the task of delimiting modal spaces where epistemic explanatory concerns are
emphasized. The metaphysical approach, at base, is attempting to carve nature at its
modal joints. When you take the metaphysical knife to the structure of the world, you are
attempting to carve out the physical possibilities for your central subject given its
relevant context; you are, in effect, looking for the set of possible state spaces for the
subject (see Strevens 2008, p. 266). But there’s no such way to carve in epistemic
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This idea has taken many forms. R.G. Collingwood (1946) talks about it in terms of “inhabiting” the
mental spaces of historical agents. Mink (1987) talks about narratives as “cognitive instruments.” For an
argument against this kind of function for narrative, the reader may want to look at Rosenberg (2018). His
argument there hinges on the unreliability of “theory of mind” for explanatory purposes. It merits
mentioning, however, that he does not directly engage any of the existing scholarship on narrative
explanation.
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contexts, as the traces of, for instance, mentality that feature in such explanations have no
apparently (fully) objective carving.
The epistemological approach seems to fail to delimit the modal space of
possibilities appropriately when applied to explanatory concerns of a more ontic flavor.
The epistemological approach is concerned primarily with delimiting possibility as a
space of possible narrative trajectories that are compatible with our knowledge situation.
This, it seems, does not fit well with a great deal of scientific practice, wherein the point
is to lay bare (to the extent possible) what the structure of physical possibilities is really
like, and subsequently, why things turned out to be the way they are. Think, for instance,
of Conrad Waddington’s (1957) “landscape” depiction of mammalian development. The
idea to be captured is that developmental patterns can be more or less entrenched or
“canalized,” which is supposed to be informative of the degree to which particular
developmental pathways are physically realizable (which, of course, depends on facts
about organismal types and environmental influences). Thinking about the modal space
over which explanations range in this context involves thinking about the world’s
underlying structure and how it affords for some possibilities and not others. The
epistemological approach falls short here.
The ecological approach, however, allows for a degree of flexibility when shifting
between ontic and epistemic explanatory modes.33 This is due to the emphasis on central
subjects and their capacities as they relate to narrative modes of explanation. In the ontic
direction, the compatibility with the ecological approach is clear: with knowledge of the
33

I want to signal here that my sympathy is with the ontic approach to explanation. Much of the recent
literature on explanation (narrative or otherwise) has been shifting in the epistemic direction (see Bokulich
2016, for instance). Some explanatory tasks may have more of an epistemic flavor, but in any empirical
discipline, the explainers, in my view, are always things in the world.
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relevant capacities of the central subject (mammals, bacteria, geological formations, etc.)
and a specification of background or contextual factors, the modal space is effectively
fixed. It is just the set of causal sequences that are possible given the structural features
that make up the capacities of the central subject and its concomitant environmental
context.
Roughly the same is true with respect to epistemic explanatory contexts. Here we
said that explanation involves some degree of projection.34 This can take several forms:
construction, speculation, perhaps some manner of idealization, or what have you. Even
in the most epistemically laden context (think literary theories of narrative explanation,
for instance), there are narrative subjects outfitted with capacities (psychological
predispositions, for instance) that drive narratives, but always in a way that’s constrained
by context. Dmitri Karamazov is driven to the brink of murder not only because he’s
passionate, but because his passion involves a particular person of interest (Grushenka),
whom his father beds. The ecological conception allows us to shift our conception of
possibility between epistemic and ontic modes of narrative explanation as needed, and in
either case, we delimit the modal space in the right way. The same is not true for other
accounts.

9. Objections and replies
I’ll now explore some objections to my account, and do my best to respond to them.
There are two potential objections that I’d like to address. I’ve already mentioned the
34

I think this must be true even in the case of Ereshefsky and Turner (2020) and the like, even though the
make no proclamations to that effect (as does Roth (2020), for instance). If your view is that explanation
must proceed in the face of widespread local underdetermination, it seems it must be the case that some of
the structure of the narrative and its modal space is projected.
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first. This is the claim that my account is not as metaphysically innocent as I’ve
suggested, since although it doesn’t command our assent to causal indeterminism and the
like, it does introduce the notions of capacities and affordances (further comments in the
final chapter will also be relevant here). The second objection we might call the
“Pluralist’s Objection.” The pluralist may argue that there’s no reason to think there was
ever a problem to solve: we can be epistemological theorists when it suits us, and we can
switch hats and be metaphysical theorists in other contexts.

9.1 Metaphysics and the ecological account
The objection here is that the ecological account is not really as metaphysically innocent
as I’ve made it out to be. The objectionable parts of the metaphysical theorist’s account
(as in Beatty 2016; 2017) have to do with its commitment to things like the reality of
unrealized causal histories and causal indeterminism (Ereshefsky and Turner 2020). But
in removing our commitment to these notions, we’ve introduced new metaphysical
concepts like “capacities” and “affordances.” What should we make of this?
It strikes me that not all metaphysical concepts are necessarily on par with respect
to a “scientific” or “naturalist” outlook. What do I mean by this? Well, it seems sensible
enough to say that our metaphysical commitments should be significantly constrained by
science. Ideally, our ontological or metaphysical outlook should not just be constrained,
but significantly informed by our scientific outlook (Chakravartty 2017). One way of
testing the naturalistic or scientific credentials of our metaphysical commitments is to
assess the degree to which they’re empirically tractable. Call this the Naturalist Criterion
of Tractability (NCT). A metaphysical commitment satisfies NCT when that commitment
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makes some difference to the success of some set of scientific practices (broadly
construed).35
So, while it may be true that the capacities and affordances are not metaphysically
innocent or neutral, I do think they satisfy NCT. I’ve already gestured at this in the
previous discussion of Darwin’s PD. In developing his thinking around PD, Darwin was
not engaging in a priori speculation on the structure of nature in relation to his theory of
evolution by natural selection. Darwin sought empirical justification for his treatment of
the nature of diversification processes. He argues that the “truth of the principle is seen
under many natural circumstances” (Darwin 1859, p. 114). He cites the properties that
contribute to patterns of diversification: geographical area, rates of immigration, level of
interspecies competition for resources, etc. So committing to the reality of capacities and
affordances is driven by the evidence available to him through the observation of natural
processes. The use of these concepts gave Darwin at least some of the necessary tools for
finding successful explanations of certain evolutionary patterns, thereby satisfying NCT.
In the words of Nancy Cartwright (2015), nature “wears its capacities on its sleeve.” The
same might be said for affordances, which are, in some sense, the flip-side of capacities.
So, while these notions may not be entirely metaphysically neutral, they seem to pass
muster from a naturalistic perspective.
One would be hard-pressed to make similar claims for causal indeterminism or
realism about unrealized causal histories. Unrealized causal histories seem to me entirely
inaccessible to observation, and causal indeterminism only in very indirect ways. Those

35

For instance, inference methods, explanations, observation techniques, model building, mathematical
representation, etc. may all fall under the umbrella concept of “practices.”
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arguing for the reality of unrealized history tend to lean heavily on speculative remarks
concerning the apparently high degree of contingency in certain kinds of natural
processes (e.g. evolutionary history). This is the tactic of, for instance, Gould (1989) and
Beatty (2006) when they discuss the “tape rewinding” thought experiment. The
experiment is simple: play forward the tape of life from beginning to end to get a full
picture of the course of evolution on Earth. Then, choose any point in that history you
like, rewind to the moment just before, and play forward again. The speculative question,
then, is, “Would the history of life look the same on the next play?” Gould and Beatty say
no; there’s just too much inherent contingency in evolutionary processes. Two plays of
the tape will never be alike, even from the same initial conditions.
We need to tease apart a few issues here. Considered with respect to NCT, certain
kinds of unrealized possibilities will turn out to be naturalistically satisfactory, while
others will not. The kinds of causal inferences defended on counterfactual and
manipulationist accounts of causal explanation and inference (e.g. Woodward 2002)
appeal to unrealized possibilities of a certain kind: possibilities that fail to be realized due
to an intervention on a system. In cases such as this, we do get some empirical evidence
about non-actual states of affairs, and it certainly counts as information that makes a
difference to scientific practice. But it is important to note that these kinds of methods are
silent with respect to the ontological status of unrealized or non-actualized possibilities.
With an intervention in place, the Woodwardian would not proceed to make claims about
whether the prevented state is a part of the world and that we should take this or that
ontological stance toward it; rather she would simply claim some modal information
concerning what the difference makers for the system are. Philosophers like Beatty
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(2017) make a further, rather drastic step. They claim that unactualized possibilities (or
alternate histories, etc.) have some claim over our ontological commitments: we should
say that they exist (what, exactly, this means is not well explained by Beatty, Gould, or
any other such theorist). This, I claim, fails to satisfy NCT, and so should not be a part of
our proper conception of narrative possibility.
The commitment to causal indeterminism is perhaps a bit more sensitive to
empirical evidence, but only in a rather indirect sense. It is sometimes argued, for
instance, that the best way to interpret random or stochastic processes in nature is to take
them at face value (see Lowe 2008; DesAutels 2015). This is to say that if natural
processes appear indeterministic, then we should assume that they are, unless and until
we have evidence to the contrary.
This claim seems ok at the level of methodology, but bizarre as a matter of
metaphysical commitment. To commit to indeterminism on the basis of seemingly
stochastic or chancy natural processes seems to require one to say that causal
indeterminism is the only explanation for the appearance of such processes. But this
seems like a stretch. Much is made, for instance, of quantum indeterminacy (see again
Lowe 2008) as regards causal indeterminism, but many interpretations of quantum
processes are on the table: Everettian interpretations, explicit theories of wave-function
collapse, and Bohmian interpretations, to name a few. All of these are compatible with
determinism even where the world appears phenomenologically indeterministic. And
besides, we seem to have plenty of empirical justification for determinism at the level of
classical physics and relativistic physics, etc. This is all enough to show that we don’t
want our account of narrative possibility to force our hand on such a metaphysically
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contentious issue. Considered against NCT, it seems like agnosticism is the best position
with respect to determinism and indeterminism. We can, in practice, do just as well in
either case.

9.2 Pluralism and the ecological account
Now we’ll consider the following worry: might it be that we should just be pluralists
concerning the nature of narrative possibility? In some contexts, it might be the case that
the epistemological approach is the one best suited to our explanatory tasks, and in other
cases it will be appropriate to take an metaphysical stance. So, rather than providing an
overarching account of narrative possibility for our theory of narrative explanation, we
should let contextual factors dictate which approach serves us best (similarly to Garfinkel
1981).
I think this objection tracks an important concern: science is not epistemologically
or methodologically homogenous (Currie 2018; Potochnik 2017; Weisberg 2013).
Scientists use different tools and explanatory strategies that reflect their different
evidential situations, disciplinary matrices, and track-records of methodological success.
Given that this is so, we don’t want to judge too much in advance as concerns what kinds
of philosophical accounts of science and scientific practice should be taken as properly
applicable. Philosophy of science is important, but it should be philosophy of actual
science, and actual science is quite diverse (along many axes of evaluation).
I agree with the above concern, but I would add that insofar as a domain of
scientific inquiry is able to support a heterogeneous array of methodologies, explanatory
strategies, and the like, we still want to know why that’s the case. It’s not very satisfying
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to leave the heterogeneity of scientific practices as an unanalyzed brute fact. I think the
ecological account of narrative possibility provides some insight here.
Even in domains where pluralism reigns supreme, the success of pluralism
(methodological, explanatory, or otherwise) must be supported by some fact about the
world (or so I shall claim). In our own case, the structural facts concerning the nature of
narrative possibility show why both epistemological-seeming and metaphysical-seeming
strategies can find success. I’ve argued that the way to think about narrative possibility is
as a complex structure of relations holding between the capacities of central subjects and
their context or environment. From the perspective of the metaphysical theorist, we’re
trying to answer something like the question, “Why, among all the possible histories, is
this the one that was actualized?” In the words of Beatty (2017) we want to know how
possible histories are “foreclosed upon.” From the perspective of the epistemological
theorist, the question is something like, “Given the limited evidence at my disposal, why
should I think that this historical reconstruction is explanatorily adequate, compared to
competitors?” The ecological account can accommodate both sorts of questions. From a
metaphysical slant, historical reconstructions aim to answer the question by showing how
the actual causal history of the central subject developed and closed off other
possibilities. This is a matter of tracing the development of the central subject and the
development of its capacity-affordance relation over time. From an epistemological slant,
we’re more interested in understanding how our limited evidence can support some set of
historical reconstructions. With respect to the epistemological question, we go about the
task of answering it by finding how the evidence can fit into our picture of the world. We
try, in some sense, to generate the space of possibilities by finding all the ways (or all the
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plausible ways) in which our evidence fits with what we know about the world. This
plays quite nicely with the idea of capacities and affordances I’ve been advancing in this
chapter.
Which sort of question scientists will ask is a matter of context, but the ecological
account answers the underlying question of why it is that pluralism and context
sensitivity prevail as regards methodological and explanatory success. The answer is,
unsurprisingly, a metaphysical one; that is, it is because the world is structured in a way
that supports a plurality of approaches.

10. Concluding remarks
In this chapter I’ve argued for a new way of understanding the role and structure of
possibility in narrative explanation. I call this account of narrative possibility ecological,
because it draws our attention to the ways in which central subjects relate to their
environment or context—a relation between capacities and affordances. We explored
other approaches that I called metaphysical and epistemological, respectively. The
advantage of the ecological account is that it respects the metaphysical theorist’s insight
that possibility is baked into the world’s structure, but resists the metaphysical
overextension that epistemological theorists warn is looming over such accounts.
Moreover, the ecological account delimits the modal space of narrative explanatory tasks
in the right way, which we saw by situating it within types of explanatory tasks, ontic and
epistemic. The result is an account with much conceptual flexibility, but which casts
some light on the conceptual machinery of narrative explanation and how it works. Now
it’s time to properly deflate narrative as a category of explanation.
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Chapter 3: Structural-Mechanical Models and
Narrative Explanation
1. Introduction
There is, as has been discussed, an historical distinction between two supposedly
different kinds of scientific activity: nomothetic as opposed to idiographic science
(Windelband 1883; Gould 1989). The thing that is supposed to mark the key distinction
between these kinds of scientific activity is that nomothetic science explains in terms of
laws, regularities, etc., while the idiographic sciences (mainly constitutive of sciences
that are “historical” in nature), if they explain, do so by some mode of narrative
depiction. In this way, the idiographic sciences are supposedly explanatorily
impoverished relative to the nomothetic ones.
I will argue that this conception of the explanatory standing of the historical
sciences rests on several mistakes. Most importantly, scientists and philosophers of
science have improperly analyzed the nature of narrative (or historical)36 explanation. I
will

argue

that historical explanations

should

be understood in terms

of

structural-mechanical models, and at the heart of this account is a concept I term
“Mechanically Generated Contingency” (MGC). What this account will ultimately show
is that

narrative explanations, as structural-mechanical models, are truth-apt

representations of mechanically driven historical processes. As such, regularities (though
perhaps not laws)37 are often quite central to the explanatory aims of historical sciences
(see Jeffares 2008).
36

I will use the terms “historical explanation” and “narrative explanation” interchangeably. This is
somewhat heterodox, but given the nature of my account, there’s no good motivation for maintaining a
distinction in this terminology.
37
Although Cartwright (1983) famously puts quite a bit of pressure on the notion that “law” is much more
than an honorific to begin with.

75

This account is quite complex. It involves a defense of MGC as the heart of
historical explanation, a treatment of the type-token distinction and its relevance to
historical explanation, causal similarity spaces and their relation to truth, and an analysis
of model representation and its relation to truth in explanation. This is quite a lot, but in
the end, we will have a generalized account of historical explanation that undercuts any
motivation for maintaining a distinction between historical and non-historical science: the
distinction becomes meaningless.38

2. Motivating MGC: an example from historical geology
Anyone familiar with the basics of contemporary geology will accept what is now
considered a basic fact about the world: the continents have moved over the Earth’s
history. Unsurprisingly (for anyone familiar with how scientific theories tend to develop
over their history), this was not always a widely accepted fact (see Oreskes 1999).

2.1 Fossilized magnetism and plate tectonics
In 1915, Alfred Wegener published The Origins of Continents and Oceans. In it, he
develops a theory of what he called “continental drift,” which is meant to account for
some empirical facts about the nature and distribution of the continents that seem highly
peculiar given the assumption of a static Earth model (e.g. equatorial glaciation, the
shapes of continental ridges relative to one another, facts concerning biogeographical
distribution of plants and animals, etc.). The theory of drift could explain these
38

Currie (2019) offers other reasons for disregarding this distinction. For him, the kinds of epistemic
activities historical scientists engage in cut across categories in a way that makes the distintion unhelpful in
making sense of what scientists do.
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phenomena, plus quite a bit more (it provides a much better explanation for orogenic
events than the static Earth model, for instance).39 The problem for Wegener was that he
could not provide a plausible mechanism for drift.40
In 1944, Arthur Holmes proposed a “motive force” that could provide the needed
mechanism for the theory of drift: mantle convection. Holmes proposed that convection
cells beneath the Earth’s crust, and driven by heat dissipation through radioactive decay
could provide the sought after mechanism that does the work of pushing and pulling the
continents around. Although this account of convection isn’t strictly correct, it did prove
fruitful (see McMullin 1984). But even with a mechanism in hand, and even though it
accounted for a broad range of empirical facts (e.g. sea floor spreading), Holmes, like
Wegener before him, received very little uptake on his theory. It wasn’t until the mid
1960’s, with the development of plate tectonics theory, that Wegener and Holmes would
ultimately be vindicated. And this was in large part thanks to the discovery of anomalous
paleomagnetic phenomena.
In the heart of North America, in the middle of the 1960’s, a seemingly strange
thing was discovered: fossilized magnetism with properties that were quite difficult to
straightforwardly explain (Raymo and Raymo 1991). Fossilized magnetism is a beautiful
thing. Volcanic rock, if it doesn’t cool too quickly or too slowly, preserves artifacts of
magnetic properties when it hardens. Small particles of magnetically reactive iron within
39

One widely held model was the “contractionist” model, the basic idea being that orogenic events were
caused by the crumpling of the Earth’s surface as it inexorably cooled from its purportedly initial hot state
(see Rudwick 2016).
40
It has been noted by others that the evidence for something like the theory of continental drift was already
overwhelming at the time Wegener first published his theory (see Oreskes 2003; Mason 2003). So formally,
the objection against Wegener was that he failed to provide a plausible mechanism. Informally, objections
probably had more to do with a general theoretical conservatism that caused many to view such
revolutionary ideas with suspicion (see again Oreskes 2003).
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the volcanic material preserve properties of “direction and dip,” which are indicative of
the locations of the magnetic poles at the time that the volcanic deposits were formed
(Raymo and Raymo 1991; Turner 2011). The direction of the magnetically reactive
material tells you the direction of the poles relative to the deposit (i.e. it gives you
information about the degree of “polar wander”), while the degree of dip gives you
information concerning how close the deposit was to the magnetic pole when it was
deposited (if it’s pointing straight down, for instance, it was on top of the pole).
Back to the peculiar features of the North American example. What made this
particular instance of paleomagnetism remarkable? As it turns out, the direction and dip
of the magnetically reactive elements in the artifact implied positions of the magnetic
poles that are physically impossible. More specifically, they implied a position for the
north pole that would have placed it near the equator off the coast of Japan (more
specifically, Japan’s current location) approximately 250 million years ago (Raymo and
Raymo 1991). Polar wander is a well-documented phenomenon. Wandering poles and
even reversals of the Earth’s magnetic field entirely are geologically common (Rudwick
2007). So why not just take the North American find and its implications at face value;
that is, why not just think it’s a rather extreme case of polar wander? This possibility is
ruled out by the fact that the Earth’s magnetic field is generated by the internal dynamo
effect of its rapidly rotating molten iron core (Raymo and Raymo 1991). While this
dynamo effect allows for a substantial degree of polar wander, it does not allow for poles
at (or near) the equator. So, this possibility is ruled out by the physical facts. How, then,
to interpret the find?
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The natural conclusion was that North America had not always been at its present
location or in its current spatial orientation. Based on the direction and dip of the
magnetically reactive elements in this particular find, we can infer that North America,
250 million years ago, was tilted about 90 degrees relative to its current orientation, and
substantially closer to the equator. Anomalies such as this proved to be a tipping point for
the uptake of a drifty model of the Earth and the development of the full-blown theory of
plate tectonics that ultimately explains them. What we have, then, is an example of what
seems like a highly particularized central subject (the particular instance of fossil
magnetism) and a very specific narrative sequence that accounts for it (the specific
movements of the continents combined with the motive force of mantle convection). I
will now show that this is the wrong way to think about this particular narrative
explanation, and also narrative explanation more broadly.

2.2 Looking past the particular: Introducing MGC
On the face of it, this looks like a prime example of idiographic science. That is, we’ve
unearthed an example of something that’s properly explained in terms of a highly
particular narrative sequence, accounting for a highly particular explanatory target. This
is to say that the account given doesn’t really generalize, doesn’t appeal to regularities,
and doesn’t cover an especially broad class of target phenomena (or potential target
phenomena). This is not right. The reason it is not right is that the explanatory power of
the narrative is underwritten by MGC. In order to satisfy the concept of MGC, several
desiderata must be met: (1) the narrative explanation in question must appeal to a general
underlying mechanism; (2) the mechanism appealed to must cover a broad array of
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contingent particulars; (3) the contingent particulars must form a causal similarity
space;41 (4) by virtue of the satisfaction of 1-3, we can say with some justice that we have
a structural-mechanical model that explains our target systems.
The case of paleomagnetic anomalies we’ve been discussing satisfies MGC. Let’s
use the most obvious features of the example for expository purposes: the direction and
dip of the North American example of paleomagnetism. The fact that a static Earth model
(like the contractionist hypothesis) can’t account for the example is perhaps what strikes
us most instantly. Next we’re struck by the fact that a non-static model including causal
mechanisms like mantle convection can provide an explanatory account. In any case,
we’re lured into thinking that what matters is to provide an explanation that accounts for
the particular instance at hand. In fact, the explanatory power moves primarily in the
other direction: the instance provides evidential support for the more general model, and
the more general model ranges over a broad array of instances, none of which are central
to the model.
The fact that this particular case of paleomagnetism was found where it was and
when it was is a purely contingent fact. This, I think, is what lures us into thinking of
narrative explanation in the traditionally idiographic sense: certain contingent events
require highly particularized descriptions, and it is these descriptions that supply
explanatory understanding in such cases (if there is any to be had). But in the example,
the contingent facts that we highlight are strictly incidental to the broader explanatory

41

This concept is taken from Strevens (2008). There will be a detailed discussion of this concept in a later
section. For now, it is enough to point out that a causal similarity space is a set of causal state space
trajectories that are the realizers for a causal mechanism, and that there are no discrete jumps between
particular trajectories within that space. This is a way of analyzing the “cohesiveness” of a model and, for
my account, picking out types.
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model. Those particular facts make no essential difference to our understanding of the
ways in which such phenomena are generated and in light of which they are considered
explanatory.
There are many ways in which we might imagine counterfactually intervening on
this system in order to probe its explanatory power (see Lewis 1973; Menzies 2003;
Woodward 2002). We could, for instance, alter some of the initial conditions (in
principle, of course) by changing the relative sizes of the tectonic plates, changing the
rate of seafloor spreading, or the intensity of mantle convection in various convection
cells, and so on. It is easy to imagine that such things might alter the causal trajectories of
phenomena that we use to explain phenomena in the deep past. Sticking to the current
example, such counterfactual interventions might result in different locations of deposit,
differences in relative rates of deposition, or differences in the geographical distribution
of deposits. But the explanatory significance of the deposits with respect to plate
tectonics theory is unaffected. The explanatory significance is driven by MGC, which is
to say that the explanation makes essential appeal to causal regularities, but not to any
particular token deposit. So while we may think that the central subject of our narrative
explanations are typically highly particularized, concrete particulars, they are actually
classes or types of particulars that form causal similarity spaces, generated by MGC. The
explanatory narrative making use of the North American paleomagnetic anomaly is not
about that particular instance of paleomagnetism; it is about the set of regular mechanical
features of the world which can generate a causally continuous space of paleomagnetic
phenomena, which we can then use to explain certain features of the world. That the
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world conspired to deposit this particular magnetic fossil in that particular location is
interesting, but strictly incidental to the explanatory power of the narrative.

2.3 Moving on
The above has begun our analysis of what will prove a rather controversial account of
narrative explanation. By focusing on MGC, we unearth an account that insists on regular
mechanisms as explanatorily central, and also that the subjects of our explanations are
type-level phenomena (as captured by causal similarity spaces). It has typically been
assumed that narrative explanations are especially suited to dealing with highly
particularized explanatory targets (Hull 1975; Mayr 1980; Glennan 2010; Richards 1992).
The same is often also claimed for mechanistic explanation (Craver 2007; Bechtel and
Richardson 2010). Given that this is the case, we need to see whether MGC can be
generalized over other kinds of historical science. It is no victory for the account if its
ability to account for paleomagnetic anomalies turns out to be a one-off case. In the next
section, I will argue that it is not a one-off case.
More generally, as mentioned above, several desiderata must be met if we can
claim with justice that MGC is satisfied as an explanatory concept: it must be the case
that the narrative explanation in question (1) appeals to a general underlying mechanism;
(2) that the general mechanism covers an array of contingent particulars; (3) that the
contingent particulars form a causal continuity space; (4) by satisfying 1-3, we can say
with some justice that we have a structural-mechanical model that explains our target
systems. These are all met in the above example. The same, I claim, goes for the case
sketches in the next section.
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3. Generalizing MGC in historical explanation
MGC, I argue, has wide application over the historical sciences. In order to defend this
claim, I’ll demonstrate its use in four scientific contexts: population genetics,
macroevolution, paleontology, and archaeology. For the sake of space, the descriptions of
the case studies will be brief in comparison to the one from the previous section. Still, in
each case, we will be able to extract information that shows MGC to be the explanatory
engine at hand.

3.1 MGC in population genetics
One conception of population genetics, as a way of capturing evolutionary dynamics, is
as a theory of “component forces” (see Sober 1984). This view of population genetics is
by no means uncontroversial (for a recent defense of it, see Pence (2017), and for
critiques, see Matthen (2009) and Matthen and Ariew (2009)). That debate need not be
settled here, but it is interesting to note that in the teaching of evolutionary dynamics (i.e.
allele replacement), population genetics is certainly taught as though it were a theory of
component forces. Let me say a bit more.
Looking to canonical texts used for teaching population genetics, such as Hartl
and Clarke (2006), we begin with deterministic models for allele replacement that
represent selection coefficients as the sole determinants of the state space trajectory for
the population. Gradually, complicating factors are introduced that are supposed to
increase the fidelity of the model: we add terms for drift, inbreeding, immigration,
segregation, and so on. Then we make things more complicated: we construct
Wright-Fisher models that are non-deterministic (Provine 1980). Here, we crank up the
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fidelity of our theoretical models by making selection a stochastic process that generates
probability distributions for the state space trajectory of a population. The same general
principles apply as in the deterministic model, but now, instead of predicting that an allele
will take value x after g generations given selection coefficients {s...}, we say there is
some probability p that allele will take value x. Even if this is not a theory of “component
forces,” it certainly appears to be appealing to a set of regular mechanisms in order to
explain the dynamics of evolutionary change, and the explanatory power of the strength
of selection (i.e. selection coefficients) in particular.
The reason for this is that we’re often interested in how selection can drive
adaptation in the face of defeaters. This can involve several strategies. For instance,
population biologists may explore the effects of selection by assuming infinite population
size (Potochnik 2017; Morrison 2015). This eliminates, for instance, drift as a potential
defeater of some stable equilibrium for a population. Terms can then be reintroduced to
see how this affects the efficacy of selection to drive populations to certain adaptive
equilibria; we relax the assumption of infinite population and reintroduce drift, and see
how much or whether this counterveils the power of selection much or at all. In both the
more idealized and less idealized case, we’re interested in a central and regular causal
mechanism: selection. This is not an uncontroversial claim. Indeed, some have argued
against the idea that selection is a mechanism (Skipper and Millstein 2005; Havstadt
2011), and historically, there have been objections to selection-centric approaches to
evolutionary dynamics (Wright 1984; Gould 2002). It would be too much to offer a
knockdown argument against these treatments here. For now, it is enough to point out
that prima facie, selection has a privileged role in explaining evolutionary dynamics; it
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either succeeds in finding adaptive solutions or it fails to, and in either case, it is central
to explaining the state of a biological population. Furthermore, as selection is plausibly
analyzed in terms of causal interactions between organisms and between organisms and
their environments (see Pence and Ramsey 2013), it is not too much of a stretch to say
that it is a mechanical process. We have, then, a general mechanism that explains a wide
array of contingent particulars, which can be analyzed as causal similarity spaces. MGC
at work.

3.2 MGC in macroevolution
The term “macroevolution” captures many things and involves many heated conceptual
debates. For instance, there is intense debate over the question of whether macroevolution
is in some sense reducible to “microevolutionary” mechanisms (Levinton 2001; Simpson
2984), or that it instead involves processes not captured by microevolutionary (e.g.
population genetics) mechanisms, such as clade selection (Gould 2002) or some form of a
non-continuous evolutionary mechanism (Goldschmidt 1960). These are interesting
debates, but I won’t solve them here.
Rather, I want to point to what I consider a general feature of certain kinds of
macroevolutionary phenomena: selection processes driving large-scale adaptive
radiations. The most notable example here is the so-called “Cambrian Explosion” (Erwin
and Valentine 2013). But other radiative impulses display similar characteristics, such as
the Ordovician biodiversity event (Webby 2004), the late Devonian “land invasion” of
terrestrial animals (Gordon and Olson 1994), and the explosive co-evolutionary adaptive
radiation of insects and angiosperms (Willis and McElwain 2014)
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What these (and other) examples have in common is the following: selection,
acting on large amounts of standing variation, driving large-scale adaptive changes in
novel ecological circumstances. These elements (selection, variation, novel ecological
circumstances) constitute a mechanism for large-scale diversification; or, perhaps better,
for what Gould (1989) terms biological “disparity”. This is to say that over short periods
of geological time, these elements provide for the underwriting mechanism that allows
for the evolution of new organismal types in such a way as to provide for the possibility
of the generation of higher-order taxa (e.g. new phyla, etc.).
The details of how these situations play out will be messy. For instance, there
have been many attempted invasions of the land over life’s history, and most failed for
one reason or another (see McGee 2013). But at any rate, these cases all share this basic
mechanism in common, and the causal trajectories they generate (i.e. the set of possible
narratives) is causally continuous. So, once more, we have a general mechanism,
accounting for an array of particulars, and which generates a causal similarity space in
the way required by the account.

3.3 MGC in paleontology
Here’s a question that many biologists and paleontologists are interested in: what kinds of
things drive lineage extinction? There are cases of extinction caused by conspicuously
non-biological processes, such as the K-T extinction and (perhaps) the “Great Dying” of
the late Permian (Erwin 2015). But in some cases, evolutionary lineages may be driven to
extinction by processes that are inherent to evolution itself. More specifically, there is

86

strong evidence that sexual selection can sometimes hijack organismal phenotypes in a
way that ultimately leads to their downfall.
A famous example of this is the extinction of the Irish Elk (Bro-Jorgensen 2014).
In this case, a secondary sexual feature (antlers) used for combat between males in
competition for mates became so large as to be ultimately encumbering for males. This
encumberment may even be multidimensional: it may be that too many nutritional
resources were devoted to antler development, or that it traded-off at too high a price
against the development of other (perhaps more crucial) anatomical features, or that the
size of their antlers made them easier targets for hunters and predators, etc. These
possibilities are clearly not mutually exclusive.
What if you wanted a broader test concerning whether sexual selection has driven
lineage extinction more generally over the history of life? Well, you’d need a rather large
data set, and you’d want it to span several distinct taxonomic groups in order to ensure
the robustness of the findings. As it turns out, paleontologists have performed studies of
just this kind.
One such study was performed by Knell et. al. (2012) on fossilized mesozoic
birds and bird-like dinosaurs. There they found strong evidence for what appears to be
rapid evolution of secondary sexual features (used for mate display and the like), and that
the most extreme values for these traits coincides with their disappearance from the fossil
record. But these are relatively small fossil sets, so one could be excused for thinking that
they don’t bear out any general conclusions concerning sexual selection as a driver for
lineage extinction.
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If you want large data sets, a good place to look for them is in the invertebrate
record. So Hunt et. al. (2017) looked for patterns of sexual selection and extinction in the
fossil record of invertebrate ostracodes (these are a type of small-bodied gastropod). The
ostrocode record is extensive both in length (i.e. there are many samples from the entire
history of ostracodes), size (i.e. the number of samples is immense), and breadth (i.e. the
ostracode record covers many taxa above the species level). There they find a result
strikingly similar to the studies of Irish Elk and mesozoic birds. Specifically, there is a
strong pattern of lineage extinction that coincides with overinvestment in the size of male
reproductive organs in the ostracode record. Obviously, for a sexually reproducing
organism, some investment in male reproductive organs is necessary; but in this case,
there is investment not just in the functionality of the sexual organ, but in its size. And
overinvestment in sexual organ size provides a clear pattern of lineage extinction.
Further, the same pattern does not hold for all ostracode lineages; that is, overinvestment
is not always present, and where it isn’t, the pattern of lineage extinction disappears.42
In keeping with the emerging pattern of these case studies, I take it that we again
have a case of MGC in the explanatory driver’s seat. There is a general and regular
mechanism (sexual selection) that accounts for a wide array of contingent particulars,
which form a causal similarity space.

42

There have been some critiques of these kinds of studies. Padian and Horner (2013), for instance, argue
that studies of sexual selection in the fossil record are conceptually misguided, because they necessarily
rely on a morphological conception of species, which implies that questions of sexual behavior can’t be
meaningfully answered. This debate is beyond the scope of this chapter, but for a (what I take to be rather
convincing) reply, see Knell et. al. (2013).
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3.4 MGC in archaeology
This example is, admittedly, more speculative than the others. That said, I think MGC
still proves illuminating for a broad range of explanatory strategies in archaeology (see
Jeffares 2008; Currie and Swaim 2021).
Here is a brief overview of what I take to be an illustrative example. There has
been, over the last few decades, heated debate over the so-called “Clovis First” (CF)
hypothesis. In brief, CF has it that the first population impulse into North America began
approximately 13,000 years ago, with a relatively gradual movement toward the
settlement of South America. This has been the received view of archaeologists since the
1970s and 1980s (and perhaps, for many, it is still received wisdom (see Fiedel 2017)).
The basic narrative is as follows: sometime during the last glacial maximum, there
existed a land bridge from Asia that extended across the Bering Strait, into the upper
reaches of North America. Humans, probably following food resources of some kind,
crossed the bridge, and began to establish small settlements in present-day Alaska and
Northern Canada. As hunting game migrated southward, and as population density in
northerly regions became less sustainable as human settlers reproduced, the natural
population impulse for the peopling of the americas trended southward (Gibbons 1996).
There are many things to say about this example. First, it appears there are many
reasons to think CF is false (Bourgeon et. al. 2017; Marshall 2001; Skoglund and Reich
2016). The reasons for doubting it are several: archaeological sites that predate the CF
model for population impulses, genomic data that seems to contradict the model, and so
on. The point here is not to settle the score on whether CF is true. Rather, whether or not
CF is true, we can say with some justice that MGC is in play.
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The CF model clearly relies on MGC: it purports to explain the peopling of the
Americas in terms of the basic underlying dynamics of how hunter-gatherer societies
track resources, and how the tracking of resources results in human settlement. The same
explanatory strategy is deployed in explaining, for instance, the emergence of the first
human settlements of mesopotamia (Scott 2017). The precise dynamics of this
explanatory strategy are beyond the scope of this chapter, but it involves the nature of the
relation between humans and hunting, followed by animal domestication processes, then
the domestication of certain plants, and the dynamics of human behavior that lead these
processes to ultimately account for permanent (or semi-permanent) loci of settlement (see
Pournelle and Algaze 2010).
But objections to CF also rely on MGC. The insistence that genetic data subverts
CF as an explanatory model, for instance, at least implicitly relies on claims about genetic
migration, which is a regular mechanism for tracking the development of genetic
populations (see Saint Pierre 2017). Likewise, controversies over the legitimacy of site
dates (i.e. debates over whether certain archaeological finds genuinely predate the “well
established” Clovis timeline) are cast in terms of regular mechanisms, like radiocarbon
dating and sedimentation rates (Marshall 2001; Bourgeon et. al. 2017). So, again, we find
that appeals to regularly operating mechanisms are central to the explanatory efforts of
historical science, and that it is in terms of these mechanisms that historical scientists
properly situate contingent evidential traces.
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3.5 Summing up
The point of this section, as mentioned, has been to show that the centrality of MGC is
not just a one-off. It is clear that MGC helps us make sense of the extended example of
paleomagnetic anomalies, but this example is not enough to establish that MGC holds
explanatory purchase over the historical sciences more generally. That being the case, I
have provided several examples to show that MGC does in fact generalize. Obviously,
the sample size here is relatively small. The historical sciences range over a large number
of explanatory puzzles, and there is no hope of covering all of them. That said, the
examples covered here are rather diverse in nature, and so this provides at least some
support for the notion that MGC generalizes, to some degree, over explanatory pursuits in
the historical sciences. Perhaps its coverage is partial, but I think we have some warrant
in claiming that its reach extends quite far.

4. A word on what’s ahead
Sections two and three offered some motivation and a defense of the explanatory role of
MGC in the historical sciences. MGC, as already claimed, is what I take to be the
explanatory heart of this theory of historical explanation. But it is not the only part of the
theory. Rather, it generates and is connected to other parts of a general theory of historical
explanation that also stand in need of some analysis.
In brief, we need to cover the type-token distinction as it relates to my account,
the nature of causal similarity spaces, the relation between models and explanation, the
relation between explanatory models and truth, and how all of these elements ultimately
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result in an account of structural-mechanical models that give us an analysis of the
explanatory power of narratives.
This is clearly a lot. The aim, then, will be to say just as much as I need to say
about each element, and no more. For instance, there is a vast literature on the nature of
scientific modeling, the explanatory power of models, whether they represent targets, etc.
(see Weisberg 2013; Potochnick 2017; Wimsatt 2007; Giere 1999; Godfrey-Smith 2009;
Bockulich 2016, etc.). This is only one of several controversies in the literature
concerning what’s to come. While I won’t pass these controversies over in silence, it is
not my aim to give comprehensive interpretations of the various positions or to offer
knock-down arguments in favor of my own (it’s difficult to see how any such
knock-down could be produced, anyhow). Rather, I will try to offer an overall picture of
the conceptual landscape, and show how my own positions in that landscape perhaps
prove illuminating. This is already relatively ambitious given the immensity of the issues
being tackled, so my hope is that the reader will give me some grace in the lack of
knock-down argumentation.

5. Historical explanation and the type-token distinction
This theory of explanation interweaves two traditions of explanatory thinking, both of
which have, by and large, stressed the point that explanation, properly understood,
involves the explanation of highly particularized entities. That is to say, mechanists (e.g.
Craver 2007; Bechtel and Richardson 2010) and narrativists (e.g. Richards 1992; Hull
1975) think of explanations chiefly in terms of accounting for token entities. Given that
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my account is (in a way) an account of narrative explanation,43 and also rooted in the
mechanist tradition, it perhaps seems surprising to stress that historical explanation is
really happening at the level of types. Let me tell you why this should not be so
surprising as you may have thought.

5.1 Mechanisms and nominalism
Mechanists (or “The New Mechanists”) generally tend to assume a nominalist ontology
(Glennan 2017). This is just to say that, fundamentally, the world is a world of
particulars, not kinds. Of course this does not mean that we cannot speak in terms of
kinds, but when we do, we’re using a kind of shorthand for the purposes of
communicative efficiency, or something similar (Hacking 1999). I have no issue with
nominalism; in fact, I count myself as one among their ranks. But it may seem that this
sits uncomfortably with the claim that MGC generates type-level explanations.
Let’s turn to an example that may help clarify how it is that MGC underwrites
type-level explanations, irrespective of nominalist commitments. Sam Baron and Mark
Colyvan (2016) argue that the Cassini Division (a gap in Satrun’s rings where no object
can maintain a stable orbit, leaving it devoid of objects, except transiently) cannot be
explained in mechanistic terms. Rather, it requires mathematical explanation. Why?
Because a mechanistic explanation gives you token level information: it gives you
individual causal stories concerning how it is that each piece of matter was ejected from
that region in space. What we want to know, they claim, is why it is impossible for any
43

I say “in a way” because this account, ultimately, results in a reduction of narrative explanation. On my
view, there doesn’t really end up being anything to the concept of “narrative” over and above
structural-mechanical models, so one might say its not really an account of narrative as such, and this
would be fine with me.
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object to maintain a stable orbit there, not how it is that this or that object in particular
gets ejected. Modal information such as this, they claim, relies on logic and mathematics,
not mechanical information, and so it may be that nominalist ontologies sometimes fail to
reach our explanatory goals, and so the same goes for mechanistic strategies of
explanation. Not so.

5.2 MGC and types
Think back to our earlier example of paleomagnetism. What’s happening here? My claim
has been this: a contingent fact is being produced by a robust, reliable mechanical process
(e.g. mantle convection). Why does this matter? Because it allows us to develop new
ways of thinking about how and why mechanical processes are explanatory.
Try this example: say you’re speaking to someone with little to no knowledge of
evolutionary theory. Now suppose this person says to you, “Could you explain to me how
speciation works?” A natural way to answer such a request might be with an example.
That is, you might come up with a particular example of a cladogenetic (or “splitting”)
event in the history of life, and say something about how that’s an example of a certain
type of speciation process (see Ereshefsky 2014), in hopes that this proves enlightening to
your conversational counterpart. But notice that in the process of explaining, we’re
seemingly required to mention that this or that particular instance of a speciation event is
in fact an instance of speciation. There is a larger process, governed by certain
transformation rules, and dependent on properties of populations and organisms that
makes it the case that such instances are explainable at all. So, by giving the example,
you have not given the explanation. The example highlights some salient features of a

94

larger mechanical property of the world which generates the instance you might have
chosen, but the explanation must make appeal to this generative process. If it doesn’t,
you’ve merely given a description of something.
What this ultimately shows, whether we’re talking about paleomagnetic
anomalies, speciation events, or the instability of orbits in the Cassini Division, is that the
tokens we mention in the examples that we use for practical purposes while engaging in
the act of explaining are of incidental explanatory value. MGC effectively guarantees that
a relevantly similar type of token would have been generated if the one that we happen to
mention hadn’t been. MGC programs for certain types of token occurrences (see Jackson
and Pettit 1990), and so it is these classes of tokens (which I’ll usually just refer to as
types) that constitute the true explananda covered by historical explanations. What this
ultimately shows is that MGC gives us purchase on structural forms of explanation.

5.3 MGC and structural explanation
Ernan McMullin (1978) draws attention to the notion of structural explanation. On his
taxonomy of scientific explanations, there are structural explanations, genetic
explanations, and nomothetic explanations.44 According to McMullin, the strength of
explanations of the structural sort have been underappreciated. Causal (or nomothetic)
explanations may allow us to, for instance, deduce our explanandum from the explanans,
but structural explanations take us further: they also “warrant assertions about the
elements and entities constituting the explanandum” (1978, p. 145).
44

He doesn’t seem to have the same conception of nomothetic as assumed in Windelband (1883) or Gould
(1989). “Nomothetic” for McMullin, seems to just denote something like “causal explanation,” so needs
not presume anything about a distinction between historical and non-historical science.
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This is worth dwelling on. Structural explanations, if this is right, give you
structural information about the products of your explanation: you learn something about
what kinds of things your explananda are, and also what kinds of things are generative of
them.45 Structure, then, allows us to generalize over tokens, because systems with similar
causal structures are apt to produce similar sets of tokens. Structure, then, is the key to
typing our tokens.
What is it that makes a particular fossil magnet what it is? The system that
produced it. But clearly we have to say more than this: in brief, the geological features of
the world, made up of certain kinds of entities and associated processes, and governed by
certain mechanical processes are what make a particular fossil magnet what it is. This is
to say that the instance is produced within a structure that, by virtue of its features, churns
out things like fossilized magnetism. By making reference to the structural features that
generate fossilized magnetism, we are able to say what fossilized magnetism is. But this
isn’t restricted to any particular instance of fossilized magnetism; all of them are covered
by the same structural mechanism. Each example is, in some sense, historically
contingent. Even so, geological artifacts of that kind are reliably generated by the
geological systems through which such deposits are formed. MGC, then, makes essential
appeal to structure, and through it, we’re able to see that even in cases where we have
historically contingent tokens in front of us, our explanatory schemas are nonetheless
centered on type-level information.

45

McMullin has less to say about this generative aspect, but it’s at least implied by his talk of how “hidden
structures” explain observable features of various entities and systems.

96

5.3 Narrative explanations: structural, mechanical, and type-level
Narrative explanations, then, are structural-mechanical explanations that explain
type-level phenomena. The basic idea shares some features with Frank Jackson and
Philip Pettit’s (1990) work on “program explanations” (as mentioned above).46 The idea
that’s important with respect to this chapter is that the structure of systems “programs”
for certain outcomes (see also Haslanger 2016). To reiterate the point in the above, what
this means is that the causal structure of the system is such that if a particular token
hadn’t been the concrete realizer for the structural-mechanical system that generated it,
some other token of the same type would have been so generated.
Contrast this approach with what I take to be a more conventional approach to
narrative explanations: what Stuart Glennan (2010) refers to as “ephemeral mechanisms.”
We can, on this approach, distinguish between two kinds of mechanisms: ones which are
robust and regular, and ones that are “one-offs” and comparatively irregular (see also
Currie 2014). To take an earlier example, it is plausible to think of speciation events as
the result of ephemeral mechanisms (or at least some of them). Such events require,
perhaps, that several contingent causal processes work in concert. For instance, you may
need some geological event to spawn a founder population, plus some fortuitous genetic
mutations, plus some favorable selective regimes, etc. We can, without doing harm to the
term, refer to the confluence of these various causal streams as a mechanism (pace
Skipper and Millstein 2005; Havstad 2011). But according to Glennan (2010), we should
count it as ephemeral. That is, it is a mechanistic system that conspires to produce
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They make no direct reference to type-token distinctions as regards various explananda, but such a
distinction can nonetheless be inferred from the machinery of their approach.
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something in a one-off circumstance, and then disappears from the world, probably never
to be replicated. Narrative explanations, by and large, are thought to fit under a
description something rather like this, at least most of the time.
But as we have seen, this way of thinking about narrative explanation is by no
means forced. Indeed, I have been arguing that the token examples that are typically
narrativized are essentially distracting us from the real explanatory action that’s taking
place at the type level. I think we can combine some of the insights from work done by
Strevens (2008) and Glennan (2017), and in so doing, I think the concepts of MGC and
structural explanation furnished so far give us a new way of understanding narrative
explanations: narrative explanations as structural-mechanical models. Developing this
account is going to take us through the development and analysis of several concepts:
causal similarity spaces, the explanatory nature of models, the relationship between
models and truth, and finally, how these things all hang together to give us a generalized
account of historical explanation. So far, we have developed and defended the
explanatory heart of historical science (MGC), and connected it to a broader approach to
explanation (structural-mechanical explanation). Now we need to develop the rest of the
theory. This will be the work of the coming sections.

6. Causal similarity spaces
In this section I will take a closer look at the nature of what Strevens (2008) calls “causal
similarity spaces,” and how it is that MGC underwrites them as a part of our overall
account of historical explanation. The centrality of causal similarity spaces will be seen in
later sections, in particular when I offer commentary on the relationship between models
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and truth. As for the present section, I will give an account of what causal similarity
spaces are, how MGC generates them, and how this concept relates to the notion of
narrative explanations as essentially type-level.

6.1 What is a causal similarity space?
I’ve mentioned the presence of causal similarity spaces within these explanatory schemes
already, but the concept deserves some more explicit and detailed treatment, as it is a
relatively difficult concept, and one that is important for the theory being advanced here.
In the previous section, I laid several cards face-up on the table. One such card is
that by adopting a mechanistic attitude toward explanation, I am effectively adopting a
nominalist ontology. This, as I’ve already stated, sits somewhat uncomfortably with the
claim that explanations (narrative or otherwise) are type-level by nature. This worry
features heavily in Glennan’s (2017) The New Mechanical Philosophy.
Glennan bites the same nominalist bullet that I do, and shares in my aspiration to
nonetheless provide for a route toward speaking meaningfully about type-level
explanations. To do so, he adopts what he terms a “models first” approach to the
individuation of mechanism types. That is, Glennan takes it to be the case that what
ultimately explains some phenomenon involves showing how the phenomenon is
produced by some mechanism, and although mechanisms and their products are all
strictly unique, he believes there is a kind of “work around” way to speaking at the type
level through the use of explanatory models. Roughly speaking, according to Glennan,
we can say that mechanisms and their products constitute the same type just if they can
be “modeled in the same way” (2017, ch. 4).
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While I’m broadly sympathetic to Glennan’s approach, it does leave me with
some concerns. My main worry is that his account will lead to a dramatic proliferation of
types. Like many other contemporary philosophers of science, Glennan seems to ground
his account in terms of “perspectivalism” or “perspectival realism” (see Giere 1999). The
idea underlying this broad movement in the philosophy of science is that truth claims
concerning models, explanations, etc. in science are importantly tied to the perspectives
from which scientists explore the natural world. In a way, the point seems trivial. After
all, we’ve all known at least since Thomas Kuhn (1962) blind-sided the logical
empiricists that the aims of scientific inquiry don’t just fall into the lap of scientists;
scientists, rather, actively shape the pursuits of scientific inquiry, and so it follows that
any analysis of science’s epistemic deliverances will involve some ineliminably
perspectival elements. That’s not the problem.
The problem, rather, is that Glennan (and perspectivalists more generally) do not
place meaningful constraints on, for instance, what can count as a model of some part of
the natural world. This, in effect, implies that anything can count as a model of anything
else, and so the “models first” approach doesn’t help us to understand how phenomena
can be typed, especially given a nominalist ontology. Models (and therefore types) will
lack what Strevens (2008) terms “cohesion.” Incohesive explanatory models, according
to Strevens, are such that clearly distinct kinds of causal processes are captured under the
same explanatory model. As a consequence, such models are “unable to function as an
explanation because [they] model not one but two distinct difference making processes”
(Strevens 2008, p. 103).
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I’m also sympathetic to the approach advanced by Strevens. Part of any account
of explanatory models has to face up to the problem of precisifying the nature of the
model-world relation and its satisfaction–Strevens’ account of cohesion, given in terms of
causal continuity, moves us in the right direction. More specifically, it moves us in the
direction of partial isomorphism (see French and DaCosta (2003)). But if we want to
save the mechanist picture of explanation as one of the central features of this theory,
there is a tension here. The perspectival accounts given by philosophers of science like
Glennan (2017; see also Weisberg 2013; Giere 1999) typically relies on relations of
similarity to satisfy the model-world relation. Partial isomorphism and similarity are
generally seen as sitting in some tension with one another. I will attempt to dissolve some
of this tension.

6.2 Similarity and partial isomorphism
Isomorphism is a formal mathematical relationship. When a mathematical structure is
fully isomorphic with respect to some domain of objects, it means that the mathematical
structure is one-to-one and onto with respect to every object within the domain of the
mathematical structure–the domain is fully interpreted (in the formal sense of
interpretation). It is hard to see how such a thing could ever be the case on similarity
based accounts of the model-world relation, in part because models, under this
conception, license too many interpretations (in the informal sense of interpretation).
Partial isomorphism, however, may stand a chance.
Under the similarity conception of the model-world relation, we’re interested in
how models fit the world in certain “degrees and respects” (Giere 1999; Wimsatt 2007;
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Weisberg 2013). These degrees and respects are, by and large, set by the explanatory
aims of scientists. But there ought to be more to the story than this.
Considered as tools used for explanatory purposes (and, granted, models can be
many more things than this), models reside within broader explanatory and theoretical
frameworks (Potochnik 2011; Strevens 2008; Garfinkel 1981). Another way of
expressing essentially the same idea is that explanatory models are sensitive to their
context of use not just in the way raised by the aims of scientists, but also in terms of
their legitimacy of use within frameworks as dictated by the world’s structure. There are
questions that are legitimate to ask and questions that are illegitimate to ask within the
context of particular natural domains. That being the case, whether some set of structural
relations counts as an explanatory model of the world is likewise sensitive to the
framework in which it is being deployed.
Here is a well-worn example, also discussed above: in population genetics, we
often assume things we know to be false within the context of a population model, but
think no worse of the model’s explanatory credentials for that fact. Often, for instance,
we assume populations to be infinite in size, though this fact can clearly not hold for any
actual population. But within the theoretical framework of population genetics, this fact
makes no difference with respect to estimating, for instance, the effect size of natural
selection on the distribution of traits within a population, given that the population is
sufficiently large (Provine 1980; Morrison 2015; Potochnik 2017). This is just to do with
the nature of evolution as a statistical sampling process: given the equations for
Wright-Fisher processes, it makes no difference whether you assume a population is very
large (if it is) or infinite. The effect size of the sampling processes that are affected by
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population size (e.g. drift) are so negligible given a large enough population that you
might as well assume the population is infinite.
But these considerations of parameter selection for a model aren’t just about the
explanatory aims of scientists. They are domain relative facts about the world, and
therefore inform the explanatory frameworks that dictate how we should go about asking
and answering questions about the world with our explanatory models. Models, then, are
partly constructed according to the aims of scientists (how could this not be true?), but
they also satisfy relations of partial isomorphism according to frameworks established by
domain-relative criteria of goodness of fit. That is, under relations of partial
isomorphism, frameworking constraints can tell us when we’ve achieved the appropriate
kind of partial interpretation of some domain.
These partially isomorphic structures are ultimately what constitute the causal
similarity spaces that we require for getting types out of tokens in the right way–which is
to say, this is the route toward resisting the proliferation of types (or kinds) that seems
problematic for similarity accounts, while still leaving room for similarity to do some
work in our overall theory.
We now have a principled way to speak about model cohesion (which will
ultimately point us in the direction of truth, for a later section). The frameworks within
which models are deployed constrain the space of models that can be considered
legitimate models of phenomena within a particular domain. In the terminology of
Strevens (2008), a legitimate explanatory model will include “all of the difference
makers” for the phenomena that the model is supposed to account for. But difference

103

making doesn’t necessarily float free from particular contexts (frameworks).47 In
fundamental physics, it makes sense to ask whether the best way to model the wave
function collapse of a quantum mechanical system is by giving a statistical representation
of the process of wave function collapse, or to instead develop a system of equations that
gives an explicit, deterministic formulation of the process of wave function collapse. But
to ask for such a model in the context of population biology wouldn’t make sense; that is,
you would get a lot of non-explanatory information, because in population biology, the
phenomena of interest are captured by equations that model different kinds of processes
(see Garfinkel 1981 for some other illuminating examples).
The upshot, then, is that relative to particular domains, we have a principled way
of speaking about partial isomorphism and similarity at the same time, and this is only to
the benefit of explanatory models. The interests of model users set out which questions
we try to answer, how we go about answering them, and deciding which tools are
appropriate for our investigation (Giere 1999; Weisberg 2013). The domain of inquiry
(i.e. historical geology, evolutionary ecology; behavioral genetics, etc.) establishes the
frameworks for legitimate use of such tools. This means that we are in a position to say
that explanatory models are more or less cohesive than others with respect to some
domain of inquiry. Relative to some set of framework assumptions, it must be the case
that genuinely explanatory models share some of the same structural features as the
explananda that raise the need for explanations in the first place. Otherwise, the
explanatoriness of various models is left mysterious, and we’re also left with no
47

Whether this is the case on Strevens’ account is ambiguous. His account of explanatory “depth” seems to
imply that, at least in principle, explanations ultimately bottom out at the level of physics. He does allow
for frameworks, but it’s unclear whether they are merely pragmatic, or whether they have some ontic
dimension on his account. I take them to have a strong ontic dimension.
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explanation for why a certain set of models coheres with respect to phenomena within
one domain, but are non-explanatory in another. If we take Strevens’ (2008) account of
causal continuity spaces as partly constitutive of our analysis of the model-world relation,
coupled with domain relative frameworks, the mystery begins to dissolve. Explanatory
models involve cohesive types that are partially interpreted within the constraints of
certain theoretical frameworks.

7. The explanatory nature of models
Early on, I defended the following claim: MGC lies at the heart of narrative explanation.
In order to substantiate this claim, I said that several desiderata would have to be met.
Namely: it must be the case that the narrative explanation in question (1) appeals to a
general underlying mechanism; (2) that the general mechanism covers an array of
contingent particulars; (3) that the contingent particulars form a causal continuity space;
(4) by satisfying 1-3, we can say with some justice that we have a structural-mechanical
model that explains our target systems.
The various sections of this chapter have developed a cumulative case for the
satisfaction of these desiderata. That is to say, we have shown that narrative explanations
in historical science do appeal to general underlying mechanisms (satisfying (1)), that
these mechanisms generate phenomena that can be treated at the level of types (satisfying
(2)), and that by analyzing structural constraints in the right way, these types form
cohesive causal similarity spaces (satisfying (3)). So, we can say with some justice, that
narrative explanations are a species of structural-mechanical explanation (satisfying (4)).
So, on this account, MGC is generative of explanations that have the form of
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structural-mechanical models. But what does this mean? In this section I will take some
time to unpack this, and point to areas where I perhaps depart from other accounts of
model-based (and mechanism-based) accounts of scientific explanation. Two such
aspects of my account are particularly controversial: I take it that my account of
structural-mechanical models is truth directed, and I take it to imply that there is no
special category of models or explanations that we might refer to as a “narrative models”
or “narrative explanations.”

7.1 Models and explanation
The turn to models in philosophy of science has been widespread. This is, in large part,
due to the fact that scientists themselves use model building as one of their primary tools
for the investigation of the world, and so naturally, philosophers of science have been
keen to figure out how to give an analysis of models. The historical development of this
approach to analyzing science and its practice is interesting in its own right, but would
take us pretty far afield from the central purposes of this project. So instead of
recapitulating that history, it is more useful to point out some general features of models
as tools for crafting explanations that have proved vexing for philosophers.
There are features of models that are seemingly ubiquitous in the practice of
model-building. These include (but are not limited to) idealization, abstraction, distortion,
fictionalization, etc. That is, there are features of models that, when introduced, we know
to be in some sense false, and yet we nonetheless understand them as tools for the
generation of scientific knowledge (see Weisberg 2007; Weisberg 2013; Potochnik 2017;
Elgin 2017). If a model abstracts away from many of the complex features of the real
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world systems we’re trying to understand, how can we say that the model is really
furnishing genuine understanding? If a model introduces fictive, idealized values for
certain parameters for a system being modeled, then in what sense can we claim that the
model-world relation is a genuine one? These are hard questions to be sure, and they’ve
motivated several approaches to the analysis of models and their explanatory uses.
It has been claimed, for instance, that models deploy “as-if” representations
(Potochnik 2017). That is, models are counterfactual representations of “real causal
patterns” in the world (Dennett 1991; Potochnik 2017; Woodward 2002).48 Others have
argued that truth in explanation can only be truth “relative to a model” (Bokulich 2017),
or that models are analogous to fictional worlds, wherein it is legitimate to raise questions
about truth, but in a way that is limited to the fictional universe itself (Godfrey-Smith
2009).49
Given that models are abstract, idealized, intentionally distorted and so forth,
what should we ultimately say about them, given that they seem to enjoy some privileged
status as exploratory tools in and over the history of science?50 Probably the most popular
answer to this question is the one already canvassed in the previous section:
perspectivalism. That is, the legitimacy of various abstractions and idealizations
concerning the explanatory uses of models is in large part (or perhaps entirely) set by the
aims of scientists themselves. That is, you can’t make sense of why a particular value
48

It’s unclear to what extent Woodward actually endorses this sense of the use of counterfactual claims in
scientific explanations. However, Potochnik does rely heavily on Woodward’s account of counterfactual
explanation to develop her account of the uses of idealization.
49
It’s unclear to me precisely how this differs from various “epistemic” accounts of model explanation,
such as Bokulich’s, but it is generally maintained that fictionalism differs in important ways from
epistemicism.
50
Lord Kelvin, for instance, went so far as to say that in the absence of a model (specifically a physical
one) we are in no place to claim that we have scientific understanding of a phenomenon at all (see Morrison
2016).
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within a model is idealized in the particular way that it is, or why certain elements are
abstracted away in the way that they have been, except by making essential reference to
the aims of the individuals making use of those models (Weisberg 2013; Potochnik 2017;
Giere 1999; Hacking 1999; Garfinkel 1981). This leads to similarity based accounts of
the model-world relation, which is to say, the model-world relation is satisfied not in
terms of, say, an injective relation from elements of the model into the domain of objects
that constitute explanatory targets. Rather, modelers themselves make qualitative
judgments about whether or not models fit with their worldly targets in the right way or
not. Rather than truth, in the formal sense, we rely on the good judgments of practitioners
to assess whether or not models are well-fitted explanatory tools with respect to the
relevant class of explananda.51
Other kinds of answers have also been given. Margaret Morrison (2015) argues
that idealizations and abstractions do not necessarily pull us away from truth. Rather, in
some cases, idealized models are our only hope for getting at the truth of the matter with
respect to the model-world relation. We’ve discussed the example of abstract values in
population genetics already, so I won’t rehash it here. The interesting thing to point out
about her argument is the following: she demonstrates that without the use of abstractions
(which is to say, false assumptions) in population modeling, we would end up with false
51

There are many variations on this theme. Bas van Fraassen (1980) has a pragmatic account of explanation
that takes us somewhat in the direction of perspectivalism, but see Kitcher and Salmon (1984) for a pretty
trenchant critique. Giere (1999) is a touchstone piece of work on perspectivalism and similarity in the
analysis of models, but his account seems to have the same problems as Glennan (2017). Weisberg (2013)
has an interesting account that is related to Giere’s, but has some more formal constraints. On his account,
the types of aims that modelers have can act as side constraints on when a model is explanatorily apt (or
even apt along some other dimension that might not be attached to explanatoriness). This is just to flag the
fact that perspectivalist and similarity based accounts are multifarious in nature, and while a full survey of
such approaches would be too much for my purposes, I at least not to the fact that this literature is
expansive and complicated.
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conclusions. This runs counter to much about the prevailing wisdom in the literature on
models and how they explain. Typically we think that models explain better when they
have more representational fidelity–the more details a model gets right, the better,
because that seems to indicate that we have a better handle on how the world really is.
Not so, according to Morrison. Population models introduce terms that are clearly false
(such as infinite values for clearly non-infinite quantities), and if that weren’t the case, we
would end up with false conclusions concerning the dynamics of certain kinds of
evolutionary change (see Morrison 2016, ch. 1 for details concerning the case). False
assumptions (like infinite values) are then ineliminable for the preservation of truth (in at
least some cases).
From a slightly different angle, Strevens (2008) argues that abstraction and
idealization can result in better explanations without sacrificing truth. In brief, on his
Kairetic account, explanatory models must capture all of the essential difference makers
concerning the derivation of some explanandum, and no more. Introducing more
information than is necessary (that is, introducing non-difference making factors)
degrades the quality of an explanation. So, on this account, explanatory models are not
trading-off abstraction against some other features involved in building explanatory
models. Rather, abstraction is a central aim of building explanatory models, because
abstract models get rid of information that does nothing to enhance our explanatory
understanding of the relevant explananda. I lean in the direction of Strevens (with some
caveats).
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7.2 Structural-mechanical models, truth, and representation
Narrative explanations, I have argued, as underwritten by MGC, satisfy the several
desiderata

necessary

in

order

to

claim

with

justice

that

they

constitute

structural-mechanical models. There are many things to say about this, and as mentioned
at the top of this section, two such things stand out: first, that models of this kind are truth
directed (or truth apt), and second that this conception of narrative explanation undercuts
the idea that narrative explanations are a special category of explanation.
What kind of thing, then, is a structural-mechanical model? Broadly, it is a model
for the production of phenomena that draws especially from the structural features of
mechanical systems, and those structural features are the explanantia for the classes of
objects (types) that structural-mechanical models ultimately explain. We have a model,
for instance, of mantle convection. That model is not the same thing as mantle convection
itself. Likewise, we have models for population impulse into the Americas just after the
last glacial maximum, the Cambrian Explosion, the Ordovician Biodiversity Event,
lineage extinction, population segregation, social stratification, and much more besides.
There are obviously many differences concerning the particular types of things that are
ultimately modeled, and therefore explained, under all of these different scenarios. But
there is something important that they hold in common: they explain by virtue of picking
out a regular underlying mechanism, which gives structural information for the
representation of the target systems to be explained as those systems evolve over time
(see Little 2013; Scott 2017; Turchin 2006; Piketty 2013).
By virtue of MGC, causal similarity spaces, and the construction of type-level
phenomena through these conceptual schemes, we can see that the following is true with
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respect to structural-mechanical models: they represent structural features of mechanical
systems that provide the transformation rules that are generative of explanatory targets.
Because of MGC and the several desiderata that have been discussed in the intervening
sections, mechanisms themselves can be appropriately typed (or, if you prefer Strevens’
(2008) terminology, they can be shown to be “cohesive”). By appealing to causal
similarity and the like, we avoid the problem with Glennan (2017) raised earlier–namely,
the proliferation of types. Recall that on this view, mechanism types are said to be of the
same type just in case they can be modeled in the same way. This view uses the similarity
based account developed by Giere (1999) and others, but, I argue, leaves some
conceptual lacunae that need to be addressed.
Recasting our thinking about the nature of models and how they explain in the
ways I’ve outlined here, shows, I think, that these problems are surmountable. Causal
similarity spaces, providing for partially isomorphic relations of satisfaction between
models and targets, allow for the possibility of assessing claims as to how good a
representation of the target system a particular structural-mechanical model is, without
having to appeal only to, for instance, the aims of modelers as determinative in the
assessment of such goodness of fit. Rather, we can appeal to the structural features of the
model, examine the way those structural features govern the transformation of
explanatory targets over time, and then look to see how well they capture the classes of
phenomena that the models should be expected to cover.
Recall briefly our main motivating example. Fossilized magnetism is a
phenomenon driven by an underlying mechanical process involving the associated
activities of volcanism and sedimentary deposition. That’s fine as far as fossilized
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magnetism in general goes, but fossil magnets were also a key piece of evidence for
another mechanical process: mantle convection (and, ultimately, plate tectonics). Arthur
Holmes (1944) had a relatively sophisticated model before any of these discoveries were
made. That is, his model was a relatively good one, given the evidence and theoretical
tools at his disposal. But we would have to wait for the geological “revolution” of the
1960s for a fully worked out theory that provided for, say, the right descriptions of the
motive forces underlying convection cells and their relation to the movement of the
continents (Oresekes 1999). Put another way, the new developments in plate tectonics
captures more of the relevant difference makers by capturing more of the necessary facts
concerning plate tectonics and how it generates the phenomenal puzzles we’re faced
with. Robust mechanisms are explanatory of the contingent evidential traces that
historical scientists are interested in, and modeling those mechanisms by elucidating the
structural features of these systems and the causal continuity spaces they cover is where
the action happens in historical explanation. We seek after models that correctly represent
the mechanical processes that generate the phenomena we care about, and by grasping a
correct representation (see Strevens 2013; Khalifa 2017), we can say that we have crafted
and grasped a correct explanation.
But this is true of scientific explanation in general. As Wesley Salmon (1984) and
Peter Railton (1981) put it, the enterprise of scientific explanation is in “peeling back” the
layers of observed reality to find nature’s mechanical heart. This is true in fundamental
physics, chemistry, evolutionary biology, geology, anthropology, etc. We look to see how
things are arranged into systems that have the productive capacity to generate the things
we observe, and when we get the relevant difference-making structure approximately
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correct, we’re doing explanatory work. The better our models do in capturing the relevant
features difference-making structure, the better the explanation. Narrative explanation,
and explanation in the historical sciences generally, is no more or less than this, and so
historical explanations are not appreciably different from explanations across the
spectrum of natural (and, more controversially, social) science.

8. Models and truth
As has been discussed, models are, strictly speaking, false. The literature on models in
science is immense, and this fact is one of the key points of analysis. Given the tendency
to abstract, distort, and so on, it has been maintained that insofar as models do explain, it
is in terms of something other than truth (Giere 1999; Cartwright 1983; Frigg 2006; Frigg
2010). It is my contention that causal similarity spaces and their attachment to
structural-mechanical models undercuts this claim, but in a somewhat restricted sense.
That is, while models of this (or any) sort might not get us to the truth of things directly
(or completely), they do provide for the resources to speak in terms of truth in
representation. Let me say a few things about this idea.

8.1 Representation
As Roman Frigg (2010) and many others point out, representation is one of the central
uses of models. This is true of, for instance, Bohr’s model of the atom, Maxwell’s
mechanical model of the electromagnetic field, the billiard ball model of gasses, and
much more. We use models to represent the pieces of nature we find puzzling, and
explore their features in hopes of explaining or understanding some of the properties of
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the target systems. This goes once more to Angela Potochnik’s (2017) idea of
“representation as-if.” We represent gaseous systems as if they were billiard balls,
perhaps as an easy means of simplification, in order to study features of the kinetic
behaviors of such systems. But, the thought is, that what is true with respect to such
models is only true within the context of the model, so the model-world relation, thought
of as a relation of representation, is something other than truth.
But why stop there? Models can be more or less correct by virtue of their
cohesiveness and their ability to capture the relevant difference-makers for a
phenomenon. We’ve already seen this in the discussion of causal similarity spaces: a
model is made better by the fact that it is not disjunctive. If an explanatory model
explains phenomena that are clearly not the same kinds of things, then it seems like we
have a relatively impoverished explanation.52 Models should pick out a continuous set of
causal mechanisms that cover a continuous set of phenomena that they generate (or, in
Strevens’ (2008) terms, phenomena to be “derived” from the explanatory model). But this
isn’t the only sense in which we might say that explanatory models can be comparatively
better than rivals.
I’ve already drawn attention to the development of explanatory models in plate
tectonics. Why are the post revolution models better? They capture more of the relevant
difference-makers, for one. Similar remarks apply across the historical development of
science. We might still use Bohr’s model for certain things, or Newtonian mechanics,
etc., and perhaps this is because they are better for certain purposes, but they are not
52

Note that this does not rule out the possibility that various phenomena can use some of the same tools of
representation. The fact that, for instance, differential equations can be used in modeling many different
kinds of natural systems does not make the models for those systems incohesive.
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better representations simpliciter than the models that have supplanted them. The
improvement of a model, then, can be said to be an improvement by dint of being truer
with respect to its representational capacity.
This should not be taken to imply, for instance, that the best representations are
ones that include the most causal detail. This has been argued, in one sense or another, by
various advocates of the mechanist approach to explanation. Carl Craver (2007), for
instance, argues that mechanical models explain natural systems the more we are able to
de-idealize them. Making models less idealized and abstract, and instead more closely
matched to the messy details of the phenomena they’re supposed to represent, means that
we have more knowledge of the mechanisms that produce phenomena, and therefore
better explanatory understanding. Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000) argue similarly
by claiming that mechanistic explanation proceeds by the removal of “black-boxed
terms” in a mechanical system. That is, we may know how parts of mechanical systems
work (e.g. mantle convection, DNA transcription and translation, speciation, etc.), but
there are other elements of the system about which we lack knowledge, and so we “black
box” those parts of our models with dummy terms, with hope to fill them in at some point
in the future (see also Bechtel and Richardson 1993).
For certain kinds of explanatory tasks this may be true. But whether it’s true or
not is independent of the status of the explanatory model as a mechanical one. Rather, it
has to do with the frameworking assumptions that set the appropriate context for
explanation, in the sense argued for earlier in this chapter. As Garfinkel (1981) points out,
an ecological model that seeks to understand how predation affects population levels
would produce bad explanations if it sought to detail all of the causal facts. Information
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about the capabilities of individual rabbits to evade wolves, foxes and the like would not
give you a very explanatory ecological model. Rather, you only need to know some
features of the population systems at a relatively high level: relative population densities
of predators and prey, reproduction rates, and perhaps some facts about the geographical
distribution of resources within the ecological setting of interest (see also Weisberg
2013). Ecological models don’t explain the facts about the lives of individual
animals–they explain the general dynamics of population change relative to some set of
population-level parameters. So the necessary difference makers for an explanatory
model will change given the kinds of side-constraints that the world imposes on models
via such frameworking assumptions. An ecological model such as the one described by
Garfinkel is a mechanistic one, but it is abstract. And further, it is not only the case that it
is relatively abstract, but it should be. Including more information would degrade the
explanatory power of the model, along the lines suggested by Strevens’ (2008) Kairetic
account. Similar remarks apply to the cases of historical science covered above: plate
tectonics, population genetics, macroevolution, arachaeology, and much more besides.
Particulars are subsumed under more general structural-mechanical models that
ultimately account for them. How it is that structural-mechanical models, such as those
involved in plate tectonics, explain is a matter of which frameworking assumptions apply
to the construction of correctly representative models.

8.2 Truth in representation
So what’s the upshot of all this talk about models and their capacity to represent? Just that
there’s no reason to be afraid to talk about models and their relationship to truth. It seems
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to me, at least, that truth-avoidance in philosophical work about models has mainly to do
with a rather substantive historical obsession in philosophy of science over the nature of
confirmation (e.g. Hempel 1965). We don’t need to have a straightforward theory of
confirmation that falls out of modeling practices in order to talk about truth in modeling,
though–although I won’t dwell on this point.
Rather, we can just point to the fact that it is possible to say of a model that it is
more or less representative of the relevant target systems. That is, there are truth-apt
sentences, such as, “Plate tectonics models as developed after 1960 more correctly
represent the structural-mechanical features of certain types of geological systems and the
phenomena they generate than did Alfred Wegener’s theory of continental drift.” Did
Wegener swing and miss entirely? No. He got some important (particularly
phenomenological) things right, but the model was subsequently improved. And it is
philosophically justifiable to say that it is true that subsequent structural-mechanical
models have better representative capacity with respect to the relevant natural systems
under investigation.
And this just brings us back, once more, to partial isomorphism. There is an
injective relation from the model into the domain (i.e. the model target). The capacity for
structural-mechanical models (or models in general) to support such injective relations is
a consequence of the fact that they are underwritten by causal similarity spaces (as in
Strevens 2008). Because regular mechanisms, like mantle convection, generate
structural-mechanical systems that produce phenomena of a certain type in such a manner
as to enable us to say that systems structured in this particular fashion are generative of
phenomena of this type, we are able to say that there is a relation of partial isomorphism
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(and a fortiori a relation of truth) that can be captured with respect to the model-world
relation. The next question, then, is whether the model is optimized with respect to this
relation of partial isomorphism. As before, the model is optimized when it captures all of
the relevant difference makers with respect to the level of explanation that is necessary
for the phenomenon. This implies two things: first, a model like Wegener’s is partially
isomorphic, but suboptimal. Second, models, even cast in terms of mechanisms, can be
abstract, and still optimal (and vice versa).

9. Recapping and concluding
We’ve come a long way. Where have we arrived? We’ve arrived at an account of
explanation in the historical sciences with some novel features. First, it is an account
centered on the explanatory role of general underlying mechanisms and the phenomena
they generate (MGC). MGC, I have argued, has wide application, even in contexts where
it is perhaps not anticipated (such as archaeology). Further, given MGC, we are driven to
an account that features types rather than tokens as the proper explananda for our account.
This is underwritten by that fact that MGC connects our explanatory practices to
framework-relative causal similarity spaces, which further allows for us to talk about
narratives as structural-mechanical models for their explananda. And further yet, this
allows us to speak about truth and representation at the same time with respect to how it
is that models explain; this is because causal similarity spaces allow for us to speak
meaningfully about structural mechanical models satisfying relations of partial
isomorphism.
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That’s all quite a mouthful! So what does the account do that matters,
philosophically? The answer, I take it, is that it knocks down a number of superficial
conceptual barriers in the philosophy of scientific explanation more broadly. Most
obviously, it undercuts our reasons for maintaining that there is a principled difference
between narrative/historical explanations and explanations in purportedly non-historical
explanations. Mechanisms feature all over the place, and guide our explanatory
endeavors in the same sorts of ways, irrespective of the kinds of phenomena we’re
puzzling over.
It also allows us to see that mechanists (and nominalists more broadly) can have
types, idealizations, and abstractions as part of their explanatory repertoire, without
having to commit to very much in terms of what they perhaps consider philosophically
otiose. Types and the like aren’t metaphysically spooky, they’re just a methodological
consequence of the fact that MGC (and mechanisms more broadly) feature heavily in
explanations across multiple scales of investigation.
Finally, the account gives us a route back to truth from models. This is a topic that
deserves more attention than I can give it in this project, but it seems to me the hesitancy
around truth-speak in the modeling literature is somewhat misguided. The route to
remedying this must go through the world; that is to say, it must be the case that the
world itself puts meaningful constraints on how models explain. I’ve argued that this
account of structural-mechanical models does that, and therefore gets us some purchase
on truth through modeling.
So, this account gets us quite a bit. Perhaps it doesn’t get us everything we want,
and perhaps it forces us to reframe some of the ideas that we’ve held as philosophically
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precious for some time now. But that’s ok. The history of philosophy is, if anything, the
history of re-thinking.
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Chapter 4: Synthetic Remarks on the Overall Account
1. Introduction
The meat of the theory of explanation in historical science that I’ve advanced has mainly
unfolded over two chapters. The first involved an analysis of the nature of “narrative
possibility,” and the second gave an analysis of narrative explanation in terms of
“structural-mechanical models.” As elements of a broader theory of explanation, it is
reasonable to expect that I should be able to provide some insight into how these pieces
fit together in a philosophically illuminating way.
To that end, in this brief chapter, I will argue that these pieces fit together by
embedding them within a broader metaphysics of dispositions. Let me be clear from the
outset: I will not attempt to offer a full-bore defense of dispositionalism as the correct
metaphysics for scientific explanation (or for the analysis of reality in general). Rather, I
will show that dispositionalism offers a way of understanding how it is that these core
elements of my account can hang together in a way that gives us a satisfying picture of
how explanation in the historical sciences can work. This is perhaps less ambitious than
one might hope, but we have to start somewhere. And besides, chapters two and three
were pretty ambitious in their own right.

2. What is dispositionalism?
In order to situate my account of explanation within a dispositionalist framework, it is
necessary to first give some remarks on what dispositionalism is (or, rather, what I take it
to be). I will not offer a complete survey of the literature on the metaphysics of
dispositions. First, that would take us very far afield from the aims of this chapter (and
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the dissertation more broadly), and it would also not be especially illuminating. Rather, I
will paint my treatment in terms of what I take to be the “fundamental idea” of
dispositionalism.
The fundamental idea is as follows: the causal relations that hold between the
objects of our universe do so by virtue of the kinds of properties they have (Mumford
1998; Chakravartty 2010; Cartwright 1989). To put a finer point on it, whether or not it is
possible for the objects of our universe to enter into certain kinds of causal relationships
depends on the kinds of properties those objects have (Mumford and Lill Anjum 2011).
This shouldn’t require much convincing. Drug therapies, for instance, are able to interact
causally with our bodies in the way that they do because they have chemical structures
that make them capable of causally interacting with receptors in our bodily tissues such
that therapeutic treatment is eventually delivered (we hope) (see Cartwright 1989).
Similar kinds of arguments apply in the analysis of evolutionary change:
according to the “propensity interpretation” of biological fitness, a major contributing
factor to the ability of organisms to successfully negotiate their environments and,
therefore, reproduce is tightly linked to the capacities that organisms have (Pence and
Ramsey 2013; Pence and Swaim 2018; Ramsey 2006). Obviously (as with anything in
philosophy) this way of thinking about the causal structure of evolutionary change has its
detractors (see Pigliucci and Kaplan 2006; Matthen 2009, among others). But it is at least
plausibly the right way to think about the structure of evolutionary change, and therefore
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can motivate our thinking in the direction of dispositionalism as a metaphysical
framework for underwriting our theorizing around explanation.53
Dispositionalism, then, stresses that our analysis of causation must emphasize the
causal activities that certain kinds of things are capable of (Glennan 2017;
Godfrey-Smith 2006). Salt can dissolve in water, but a diamond can’t. Why? They have
different structures, and by virtue of their different structures, they interact differently
with water. Aspirin can relieve a headache, but rosuvastatin can’t. Why? They interact
with different kinds of receptors by dint of their chemical composition.
So, then, the fundamental claim of dispositionalism is that what kinds of causal
relations are possible is restricted by the properties of interacting objects. In Getting
Causes from Powers, Stephen Mumford and Ran Lill Anjum (2011) propose a “vector
analysis” of dispositional causation. The idea is just that the properties of objects, given a
set of interactions, dispose physical systems toward or away from certain outcomes. That
is, aspirin might dispose toward the alleviation of headaches by chemically interacting
with human bodies in such a way as to lower blood pressure in such a fashion as to defeat
vasoconstriction that leads to headaches of a certain kind. But other substances (say,
alcohol) can act as a defeater in such cases. There are causal vectors moving toward and
away from a particular state: “headache alleviation.” What explains this network of
vectors is the properties of objects that nudge the system (such as the human body) in one
way or the other. The kinds of causal interactions that can occur are vast (consult any
biology textbook for confirmation), but they are still restricted. And the reason causal
53

I am taking for granted that explanation needs a metaphysical framework in order to make sense of it. As
should be clear by now, I take the side of Wesley Salmon (1984) in thinking about explanation in “ontic”
terms: the things that explain phenomena in the world are other things in the world.
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interactions are restricted is that physical systems can only do the things that their
features will allow for. Aspirin won’t get you drunk, and alcohol won’t help your
headache (at least, not in the long run).

3. Why is dispositionalism illuminating?
An immediate question arises: why should I understand dispositionalism as a conceptual
apparatus that helps me to make sense of historical explanation? It’s clear, for instance,
that dispositions of objects can be illuminating in the case of aspirin alleviating
headaches or salt dissolving in water (Salmon 1984; Cartwright 1989). It’s less obvious
that dispositionalism can make sense of, say, adaptive radiations in the deep history of
life, or major transitions in evolution (such as the emergence of eukaryotes or the
development of multicellular organisms (Smith and Szathmary 1995)). But the role of
dispositions, I think, is not so different from these simple cases to more complex ones.
Rather, it is simply the case that the features of complex systems disguise the fact that the
same basic analysis of the metaphysics of causation applies in the case of the dissolving
of salt in water as in the case of major adaptive bursts in the history of life.

3.1 What can things do?
Here is what I take to be one of the basic questions as concerns the nature of reality: what
are things able to do? E.J. Lowe (2008) offers up that the answer to this question cuts to
the core of any metaphysics of causation.54 Similar insights can be taken from, for
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In this particular case, Lowe is using the idea to motivate a metaphysics for personal agency. That is
neither here nor there as regards this project, but the basic insight is illuminating nonetheless.
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instance, James Woodward (2002) and other interventionists. Effectively, Lowe (and
others) argue that figuring out how the world is begins with figuring out what the things
in the world are enabled to do. One way of figuring out what things can do involves
intervening on systems (this is how we end up with counterfactual accounts of causation).
But this analysis seems incomplete (whether we’re talking about historical explanation,
or explanation in general).
Dispositionalism takes (what I think of) as the epistemic deliverances of
interventionism and makes them metaphysical. Through intervention, we find out certain
kinds of things about what certain kinds of things can do: we learn about some of their
capacities. This is the strategy of “knock-out” experiments in medicine, for instance.
Medical researchers look for gene variants and try to figure out whether they’re good
candidates as mechanisms of action for various diseases by splicing them out of a genetic
sequence and seeing whether it has a statistically significant effect on the production of
the disease type in question (Tabery 2014; Longino 2013). Similar kinds of
methodologies apply to model-based experiments in climate modeling and more
(Winsberg 2018).
But obviously our knowledge here is quite limited. We can only intervene on
systems in certain ways, and there’s no guarantee that we’re doing it in a way that’s
productive of knowledge (or, at least, the kind of knowledge we want). But intervention
does show us something that I think is quite significant, even when it fails to achieve
some particular scientific aim: it shows us that, in the final analysis, figuring out what
things are is primarily a matter of finding out what things can do.
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3.2 What does this have to do with historical explanation?
I said from the outset of this chapter that I would not be able to give a knock-down
argument in favor of dispositionalism. However, I can offer some suggestive conceptual
paths that might show why it is illuminating in terms of historical explanation.
Recall the basic argument of chapter two: narrative possibility is best construed as
a relation between the objects of historical inquiry and their respective environments.
This, in effect, amounts to the claim that the proper analysis of modal space within
historical explanation means accounting for how it is that the objects of historical inquiry
can move through time and space. Fossil traces end up where they do in time and space
because of certain features of the causal systems they’re intertwined with; the same is
true of iridium deposits at the K-T boundary, fossilized ostrocodes, and human remains
found at sites that apparently predate the Clovis First hypothesis (thus disrupting its
narrative structure).
All of these facts involve constrictions on the kinds of causal interactions that are
available to these systems, which points to the fact that different kinds of things will
evolve (in the broad sense of the term) in causally multifarious ways over the course of
their history. Certain kinds of animal bodies, say, were just disposed in a way so as to
develop bilaterian anatomical structures. This might have to do with genetic features
(Ruse 2008; Wagner 2018), or perhaps biological features of some higher order (Gould
2002). For my purposes it makes no difference: what matters is that our account of
explanation will hinge on whatever features it is that makes causal systems capable of
evolving in the way that they do.
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4. Putting the elements together
What’s the upshot, then? How do these elements (the ecological account of narrative
possibility and the structural-mechanical model account of narratives) amount to an
account of explanation for the historical sciences?
As I’ve been suggesting above, explaining the world is chiefly a matter of
figuring out what the things of the world can do. But the question of figuring out what the
things of the world can do is complicated and multifactorial. I can’t really do justice to
how complex the work of fully fleshing out the question of “what things can do” would
be. Even just in semantic terms, a fully fleshed out account would have to deal with the
question of what an “activity” means under all the possible descriptions of the activity
(see Roth 2019). But here, anyway, is a kind of gloss.
The ways in which causal systems can evolve is an immense state space (see
Gould 1989). But, as I’ve said, it is not unrestricted. The reason that it is not unrestricted
is because the kinds of causal interactions objects can fit into is limited: objects are
disposed towards certain kinds of causal outcomes, and away from others (Glennan 2017;
Glymour 1995). Here is where the elements of my account start to help make sense of
explanation in the historical sciences, and shows how it is that dispositionalism provides
the framework for showing how that is.

4.2 The ecological account, causal-structural models, and dispositionalism
A brief restatement of the ecological account of narrative possibility is just what was
stated in the above: what is possible for a system is just to be analyzed in terms of the
structure of capacities and affordances provided by the system under investigation and its
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respective environment. Possibility is a matter of what can be done. Analyzing historical
explanation in terms of structural-mechanical models gives us some grip on how to say
substantive things about what the relevant features of these systems are when we’re going
about the work of developing explanations.
Structural-mechanical models, recall, pick out the structural features of systems
that make them generative of certain kinds of phenomena (as in Jackson and Pettit 1990).
But clearly this takes place against a background of other causal factors that restrict the
ways in which these physical systems can evolve (as in Mackie 1974). The evolution of
angiosperms, say, could have gone many ways (in the sense that there are many causal
pathways that were compatible with angiosperms as a physical system and the set of
affordances open to it within the broader space of possible evolutionary outcomes). But
in what sense is that true? It is true in the sense that the structure of angiosperms (their
specific methods of reproduction, etc.) made certain outcomes possible, but these
outcomes are constricted and must be explained in terms of the background of
affordances that are open to a system of that type. In a sense, dispositions are everywhere,
which is the point of Stephen Mumford and Ran Lill Anjum’s (2011) vector analysis of
dispositional causation. The background of affordances are just other causal systems that
interact with those that may form the focus of our explanatory efforts, and in a mutual
fashion, they all restrict the space of possible outcomes for all other such interacting
systems.
Adrian Currie (2018) draws upon a rather illuminating example. During the
neoproterozoic period (around 650 MYA) it is widely believed that Earth underwent a
period of mass glaciation, dwarfing anything like glaciation levels during the last glacial
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maximum (see also Turner 2007; Currie 2014). But there are interesting questions as to
the extent of the glaciation during the “Snowball Earth” period, and the reason they’re
interesting, to my mind, is that they reflect this broader pattern of explanatory
strategizing that my account points toward.
The thing to be puzzled over is something like the following: we have strong
evidence for massive glaciation due to a positive feedback effect following from high
global albedo (basically, surface reflectance of the Earth due to high concentration of
continental land masses near the equator). But we also have strong evidence of a huge
radiative burst of new life-forms in the period just following the neoproterozoic Snowball
Earth (specifically, the Cambrian explosion). These facts feel as though they are in
tension: massive glaciation in no way feels like the sort of thing that disposes life systems
on Earth toward giant adaptive radiations of new life forms. So, the structure of the
mechanical model needs to be revised in order to provide for the necessary affordances.
This is exactly what researchers focused on this puzzle have done. The seemingly
prevailing model now is what is sometimes called “Slushball Earth.” Glaciation, even in
equatorial regions, was widespread, but upon further investigation, there is some good
evidence to support the idea that the oceans, while cold and icy, were “slushy” in
structure. This provides explanatory routes for two things: first, it allows us to explain
why life wasn’t snuffed out (or at least nearly so) in the neoproterozoic, and second, it
allows us to explain how something like the Cambrian Explosion could have followed in
the wake of these events.
In the first case, the slushy model allows for the possibility of oxygen levels
required for basic life functions like cellular respiration, whereas it is not clear how this
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would be possible given an Earth that’s frozen solid.55 Second, and in my opinion more
interestingly, it shows you that contrary to some initial intuitions, neoproterozoic
glaciation might have served as an engine for evolutionary innovation that only became
fully expressed in the Cambrian.
With the slushy model, what you get is the possibility of “pockets” of organisms.
That is, at certain places in the ancient seas you could have had relatively isolated pockets
of organisms surviving, reproducing, and innovating during this particularly cold stretch
of time in Earth’s history. An easy application of Wahlund’s Principle will show you that
this implies a large degree of genetic heterogeneity across the various populations
occupying these various “pockets” of evolutionary innovation (see Hartl and Clark 2006).
Diversity, then, was baked into the structure of the Cambrian Explosion by the population
structures implied by the Slushball Earth period.
Population segregation means that organisms were disposed toward evolving in
different ways given the relevant evolutionary milieu of their specific icy habitat. So,
“disparity” of form (in Gould’s (1989) terminology) would begin to develop as a matter
of course. Then, in the relatively (which is to say, geologically) rapid warming of the
Earth in the interregnum between the neoproterozoic and the Cambrian, the combinatorial
possibilities for organism types, body plans, etc. would have been increased in dramatic
fashion as these various enclaves could intermingle and exchange genetic material and
the like. Revising the mechanical structure of the model, and therefore the background of
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Note that there is some degree of controversy here. It has been proposed that other kinds of mechanisms
would create carbon sinks that would make conditions workable even in the case where Earth is frozen
solid, but there’s good evidence to suggest that those mechanisms would still be insufficient.
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affordances, allowed for an explanatory strategy that is workable in terms of a plausible
set of causal dispositions.

4.3 Generalizing a bit
The above, I think, bears out the sort of account I’ve been driving toward this whole time.
Similar remarks, mutatis mutandis, would apply to the kinds of examples covered in
chapter three of this dissertation. Explanatory strategies in historical science hinge on
trying to figure out how the mechanical structures of systems fit into the broader milieu
that constrains the possible state space that the system can cover. This, ultimately (I
think) grounds out in a metaphysics of dispositions. This holds whether we’re talking
about the kinds of human systems archaeologists are trying to explain, non-human
systems that paleontologists are trying to explain, and so forth.
The question of “what things can do” is far from a simple one. But the above
example (and ones discussed in previous chapters) shows that they’re not entirely
intractable. Is the Slushball Earth model of the neoproterozoic a perfect one? Almost
certainly not. But it need not be perfect in order to gain some substantial headway on the
kinds of insights needed for building explanatory models of things that happened in the
remote past. Rather, we need approximations that are “true enough” (Elgin 2017) to get
our explanatory apparatus up and running.
This task is not itself simple. Archaeologists, for instance, are aware of the
necessity of “bootstrapping” arguments and temporary “scaffolds” to get their research
going (Wylie and Chapman 2015). But in any case, when our explanatory aims hit their
mark (or at least begin to, or approximate something like hitting the mark), it is because
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dogged researchers have figured out good strategies for fitting structural-mechanical
models into a system of affordances in a way that seems at least plausible. And this,
ultimately, rests on questions of how things in the world are disposed to act with respect
to one another. Obviously the answers to all such questions are provisional and open to
revision: it would be too much to assume that our explanatory understanding of the
Earth’s deep past could ever be complete. But paying attention to the underlying causal
structure of the world and how it generates systems of affordances is, I think, crucial to
understanding how we can come to have any genuine explanatory understanding of the
deep past at all.

5. Concluding remarks
We’ve gone through a lot in chapters one to three: a taxonomy of approaches to
narrative/historical explanation, an account of what it means for something to count as
narratively “possible,” and finally an account of the underlying machinery (according to
me) that makes such explanations work.
The obvious objection to my account is that “narrative” features nowhere
prominently. Narratives are supposed to be stories, and these are things that should have a
middle, beginning, and end (Aristotle 1997; Ricoeur 1990; Gallie 1964). This might be
true for the kinds of things we normally call “narratives”: the driving rhetorical arc of a
great novel like The Brothers Karamazov, a wonderful film like Darren Aronovsky’s
“The Fountain,'' or a moving musical play such as Jason Robert Brown’s “The Last Five
Years.” People working on explanation in the historical sciences have likened the notion
of history, as we might understand it in the world of nature, to something like the
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structure of narrative in this more literary sense. Indeed, they take it to be constitutive of
what makes explaining things in the historical sciences different from explaining things
in “other kinds” of science.
In the many pages written here, and through many hundreds of hours of writing
and research, I have worked to dispel the notion that narrative has any special standing as
a category of explanation in the sciences. But this sentiment can be reversed: the
so-called “nomothetic” sciences have no explanatory privilege over historical geology,
paleontology, and all the rest. Rather, the quest for explanatory understanding is of a
whole. It seeks after the underlying mechanisms that make the world the way that it is,
and this is so whether we’re seeking after explanatory understanding of fundamental
particle physics, or puzzling over geological facts about fossilized magnetism.
The annales school of historical analysis is no longer in fashion. There are
probably good reasons, historiographically speaking, for this fact, but we should not
pretend as if the people working in this thought tradition weren’t onto anything. Their
most important contribution, in my estimation, is the introduction of the concept of the
longue durée. That is, the idea that history should be analyzed in terms of the deep trends
that underlie the ephemera of experience.
In his first book, Fernand Braudel (1949) meditated that histories, which is to say,
historical moments, are like ripples on top of a vast sea. The ripples seem significant to
us, but only because they are what we experience; but it is what’s underneath that really
counts. This, in sum, is the real point of this entire project.
If we want to explain how it is that the systems of the world have evolved over
time, and why it is that they appeared the way they did in the remote past, then we have
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to pay attention to the deep rhythms of time. Perhaps this means adopting some
(modified) version of Lyell’s (1830) uniformitarianism. Perhaps not. It certainly means
that we have to pay attention to the underlying causal mechanisms that generate the
ephemera we observe. These processes are general, and pervasive, but can still have a
tendency to escape our notice when we observe particular artifacts of the world’s history.
But if we want to gain real explanatory understanding of the world and its history, we
can’t avoid the work of discovering the deep rhythms that the world tries to conceal.
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